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ARTICLES 
LOWER COURT CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
CIRCUIT COURT DISCRETION IN A 
COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM 
DONI GEWIRTZMAN 
While federal circuit courts play an essential role in defining what the Constitution 
means, one would never know it from looking at most constitutional scholarship.  The 
bulk of constitutional theory sees judge-made constitutional law through a distorted 
lens, one that focuses solely on the Supreme Court with virtually no attention paid to 
other parts of the judicial hierarchy.  On the rare occasions where circuit courts appear 
on the radar screen, they are treated either as megaphones for communicating the 
Supreme Court’s directives or as tools for implementing the theorist’s own interpretive 
agenda.  Both approaches would homogenize the way circuit courts make choices about 
constitutional meaning, carving independent federal judges into cookie-cutter replicas 
of either the theorist or the Supreme Court.   
These “one size fits all” theories fail to see circuit courts for what they are—parts of 
an interpretive system where constitutional law is made from both the top-down and 
from the bottom-up.  This partially decentralized structure positions circuit courts to 
help the system adapt to changes in its environment and ensure its long-term stability 
and survival.  Rather than focusing on their “inferior” position in the judicial 
hierarchy or the “best” available theory of constitutional interpretation, circuit courts 
should use their interpretive discretion in constitutional cases in ways that serve this 
adaptive function. 
This Article uses a “complex adaptive system” model to explore how decentralized 
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systems balance their need for overall order and stability with demands for evolution 
and change.  These systems rely on two factors:  variation (the degree to which the 
system’s components differ from one another) and interdependence (the degree to which 
the system’s components affect one another) to manage those competing forces.  When 
applied to circuit courts, a complex adaptive system model shows the importance of 
generating different answers to difficult interpretive questions rather than a uniform 
approach, and developing mechanisms for facilitating interpretive communication 
across circuits.  In turn, it offers the promise of aligning constitutional theory with the 
way constitutional law is actually made. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most accounts of constitutional lawmaking begin and end with the 
United States Supreme Court.  The overwhelming majority of 
textbooks, courses, treatises, and scholarship treat the Court as the 
sole driver of constitutional change, embedding its directives in 
written opinions that are then dutifully enforced by its inferior 
minions.  
As many others have pointed out, this Court-centered account is, at 
best, radically incomplete.  Among other things, it ignores the impact 
of non-judicial actors on the evolution of constitutional norms, 
including Congress,1 the President,2 social movements,3 and public 
opinion.4   
But this obsessive academic focus on the Supreme Court also leaves 
out another set of critical constitutional actors:  lower federal court 
judges—the forgotten stepchildren of constitutional theory.5  These 
judges are more than simple megaphones that shout the Court’s 
directives to the masses; they are active players in the creation of 
constitutional meaning.  They are capable of stopping a 
“constitutional revolution” dead in its tracks, making choices between 
competing doctrinal strands, taking subtle actions to undermine 
                                                          
 1. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five 
Power:  Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 
2022 (2003) (“[T]here are also strong independent reasons for affirming Congress’s 
authority to employ Section 5 power to enforce its own constitutional 
understandings.”). 
 2. See Keith E. Whittington, Presidential Challenges to Judicial Supremacy and the 
Politics of Constitutional Meaning, 33 POLITY 365, 367 (2001) (“[P]residents contend 
for the institutional authority to interpret the political order, in order to reconstruct 
that political order on new grounds.”).  
 3. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling:  Identity-Based Social Movements and 
Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2001) (arguing that collective action on the 
part of “social movements are surrounded by and seek to influence law”). 
 4. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 137 
(2009) (discussing the evolution of the Court in relation to “those who had power 
over it”).  But see Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About 
Elites, Not the American People, 98 Geo L. J. 1515, 1580 (2010) (concluding that 
Supreme Court justices “are more susceptible to influence from elite groups than 
from the mass public”). 
 5. See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 307–08 
(2005) (assessing the relative lack of scholarly analysis of lower court influence on 
constitutional law); Patricia M. Wald, Upstairs/Downstairs at the Supreme Court:  
Implications of the 1991 Term for the Constitutional Work of the Lower Courts, 61 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 771, 772 (1993) (“[I]n their focus on what happens ‘upstairs’ at the Supreme 
Court, observers often fail to recognize the efforts ‘downstairs’ in the lower federal 
courts and state courts.”). 
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established doctrine, proposing new constitutional rules to address 
novel situations, acting in willful defiance of existing Court 
precedent, or dutifully enforcing established rules.   
Consider the following examples, each of which highlights the role 
of lower federal courts in determining what the Constitution means: 
x Commerce Clause.  Despite multiple indications of the 
Supreme Court’s willingness to curtail Congress’ power to 
pass legislation under the Commerce Clause,6 lower federal 
courts have steadfastly declined to follow the Court’s 
invitation to impose meaningful constraints.7  
x Second Amendment.  In the aftermath of the Supreme 
Court’s historic decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller8 and 
McDonald v. City of Chicago9 expanding the scope of Second 
Amendment protections, lower courts have rejected an 
overwhelming number of subsequent constitutional 
challenges to gun control laws.10  
x Substantive Due Process.  Circuit courts have adopted 
dramatically different approaches when interpreting and 
applying Lawrence v. Texas.11 To date, the Supreme Court 
has not elaborated on its decision, leaving Lawrence’s scope 
an open question for lower courts to wrestle with.12 
x Federalism.  Despite Supreme Court doctrine that applies 
                                                          
 6. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618–19 (2000); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995).   
 7. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance:  The 
New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253, 
1254, 1256 (2003) (analyzing lower court opinions and concluding that lower courts 
have significant power “to shape constitutional doctrine”). But see Florida v. U.S. 
Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1311–13 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding 
portions of the Affordable Care Act to be beyond the scope of Congress’ power 
under the Commerce Clause), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400). 
 8. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 9. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 10. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)?  
Lower Courts and the New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1257–60 
(2009) (analyzing Heller’s effect on lower court opinions and noting that “[t]he lack 
of lower court enforcement . . . might leave gun rights advocates feeling cheated”). 
 11. 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see, e.g., Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817 
(9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that Lawrence “applied something more than traditional 
rational basis review”); Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 746 (5th Cir. 
2008) (explaining that, after Lawrence, “controlling what people do in the privacy of 
their own homes because the State is morally opposed to a certain type of consensual 
private intimate conduct” is “an insufficient justification” for banning certain 
behavior); Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding 
that “public morality survives as a rational basis for legislation even after Lawrence”). 
 12. See Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance:  Substantive Due Process 
Since Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV. 409, 410–12 (2006) (commenting on the 
fact that Lawrence did not “usher in a new era of expanded constitutional freedom,” 
as scholars predicted). 
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the same First Amendment and Equal Protection standards 
to federal and state actors, lower federal courts grant 
significantly greater deference to the federal government 
than to state governments in free speech and equal 
protection challenges.13 
x Military Deference.  After a growing minority of lower federal 
courts sustained constitutional challenges to the military’s 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy,14 Congress voted to allow 
openly gay officers to serve, making it unnecessary for the 
Supreme Court to issue a definitive ruling on the law.15 
x Equal Protection.  Despite governing Supreme Court 
doctrine that allowed public universities to use race as a 
factor in admissions decisions to achieve a diverse student 
body,16 the Fifth Circuit nevertheless held that the 
University of Texas was forbidden from using race to 
achieve that goal.17 
x Executive Authority in the War on Terror.  In the aftermath of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush,18 
setting limits on the scope of the government’s detention 
                                                          
 13. See Adam Winkler, Free Speech Federalism, 108 MICH. L. REV. 153, 154–55 (2009) 
(“This study shows that speech restrictions adopted by the federal government are 
far more likely to be upheld than speech restrictions adopted by other levels of 
government.”); Adam Winkler, The Federal Government as a Constitutional Niche in 
Affirmative Action Cases, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1931, 1933 (2007) (analyzing federal court 
decisions and finding evidence that “federal courts tailor the equal protection right 
to give unusual leeway to the federal government in the context of affirmative action, 
regardless of the formalities of equal protection doctrine”). 
 14. See Witt v. U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1317 (W.D. 
Wash. 2010) (finding that applying the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy did not 
“significantly further the government’s interest in promoting military readiness, unit 
morale and cohesion”); see also Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 
2d 884, 911, 926–29 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (finding the plaintiff entitled to “a judicial 
declaration that the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Act violates the Fifth and First 
Amendments”), vacated, 658 F.3d 1162, 1162 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the 
legislative repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” had rendered the case moot).  
 15. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 
(2010). 
 16. Grutter v. Bollinger. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 17. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The law school has 
presented no compelling justification . . . that allows it to continue to elevate some 
races over others, even for the wholesome purpose of correcting perceived racial 
imbalance in the student body.”).  Other examples of lower courts rejecting well-
established precedent include United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 
1999) (finding Miranda inapplicable to “the admissibility of confessions in federal 
court”), rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), and State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 
413 (Mo. 2003) (ruling that the Supreme Court “would hold that the execution of 
persons for crimes committed when they were under 18 years of age violates the 
‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’”), aff’d 
sub nom. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
 18. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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authority and providing some procedural guarantees for 
detainees, the D.C. Circuit has dramatically constrained the 
potential scope of the decision.19  
In each area, lower federal courts are independently defining what 
the Constitution means, acting as key participants in “an ongoing 
interaction involving elements of both cooperation and conflict” 
between different levels of the federal judiciary.20  Once these courts 
enter the picture, the process of constitutional interpretation 
becomes vastly more complex.  Instead of a body of law created solely 
by a single actor—the Supreme Court—the final result is produced 
by interactions among many actors within an interpretive system that 
is both hierarchical and decentralized:  constitutional law made from 
the top-down and from the bottom-up.   
Yet the overwhelming bulk of constitutional scholarship has 
ignored the substance and effect of these interactions.21  We are left 
with an incomplete picture of the constitutional lawmaking process, 
one that portrays a complex multi-layered interpretive system as a 
simplistic militaristic hierarchy run by nine individuals in 
Washington, D.C.  As a result, “[n]ormative theory has failed to 
develop a satisfactory (or almost any) account of the lower courts’ 
role in the development of constitutional meaning.”22 
This Article is an effort to fill that theoretical gap.  It focuses 
exclusively on federal circuit courts,23 and argues that the few existing 
models of lower court constitutionalism fail to see these courts for 
what they actually are:  vital parts of a larger interpretive system where 
authority flows in many directions.  Instead, these models position 
court of appeals judges as subservient drones that have little to add 
beyond their ability to serve the queen or as vehicles for 
implementing whatever the theorist’s preferred interpretive theory 
happens to be.24 
                                                          
 19. Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1838402. 
 20. Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories:  Law and the Judicial Hierarchy, 
105 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 575 (2011). 
 21. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 295 (“Constitutional theory does not think 
much of the notion of the Supreme Court being constrained by the lower courts.”). 
 22. Id. at 307–08. 
 23. Federal district courts are critical parts of the interpretive system and present 
a range of different issues, including their fact-finding capacity and the ways in which 
factual framing affects other elements within the system.  Similarly, state courts serve 
as an alternative locus of interpretive experimentation, raising a range of other issues 
involving federalism.  Both are worthy of additional study, but beyond the limited 
scope of this Article. 
 24. See generally Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction:  The Forward-Looking 
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1994) (comparing and 
contrasting the precedent and proxy models). 
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In their place, this Article adopts a different approach to lower 
court constitutionalism.  It uses complexity theory—a body of work 
originating in the physical and molecular sciences that has drawn 
increasing interest from legal scholars over the last fifteen years—to 
position circuit courts as critical agents within a “complex adaptive 
system” of constitutional interpretation.25  Under the right conditions, 
these systems are remarkable for their ability to maintain overall 
stability while allowing their component parts to operate 
autonomously.  The result is a system that uses decentralization to 
adapt to dynamic environments while maintaining its sense of 
cohesion and identity. 
The principles that allow complex adaptive systems to function and 
thrive can help define the circuit courts’ proper role in developing 
constitutional meaning.  This approach requires a new theoretical 
focus, one that emphasizes institutional design and shifts away from 
claims based on judicial hierarchy or the correct constitutional 
methodology.  
Instead of reinforcing the court’s authority or arriving at a 
widespread consensus on the “best” possible interpretive approach, a 
complexity approach seeks the best way for the system to operate at 
the ideal point between interpretive rigidity on one hand and 
randomness on the other.  An interpretive system becomes too rigid 
when it locks into long-term rules that are based on outdated 
assumptions about the way the world works or result in bad 
outcomes.  It becomes too random when the component parts of the 
system act in ways that are isolated and independent of one another, 
causing the system to lose its collective integrity and legitimacy.   
In seeking this balance between rigidity and randomness, two 
elements are critical to adjusting exactly where the system falls along 
the continuum:  variation and interdependence.  Variation focuses 
on the level of diversity among the system’s components and pays 
close attention to the number and placement of “outliers” that offer 
interpretive perspectives outside the mean.26  Interdependence 
                                                          
 25. See, e.g., Barbara A. Cherry, The Telecommunications Economy and Regulation as 
Coevolving Complex Adaptive Systems:  Implications for Federalism, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 369 
(2007); J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity:  A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885 (2008) 
[hereinafter Ruhl, Law’s Complexity]; J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law:  Using Complexity 
Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 
49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996) [hereinafter Ruhl, Fitness of Law]; J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. 
Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law in Modern Administrative States:  Using Complexity Theory to 
Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 
30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405 (1997); Deborah Tussey, Music at the Edge of Chaos:  A 
Complex System’s Perspective on File Sharing, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L. REV. 147 (2005). 
 26. See infra Parts III.B., IV.B.1. 
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focuses on the ways that the system’s components communicate with 
one another and affect each another’s behavior. 27      
A complexity theory of lower court constitutionalism seeks a way to 
determine whether the system is too random or too rigid, and the 
methods for “tweaking” the level of variation or interdependence so 
that it arrives at the ideal point between the two.  This will no doubt 
produce an interpretive system that has greater variation and less 
uniformity than the one we have now.  But it is a system that is better 
suited to evolve and remain influential in an increasingly complex 
and dynamic society where information flows rapidly, identities and 
agendas shift constantly, and ideas and capital move quickly across 
national boundaries. 
Part I of this Article begins with an overview of the precedent 
model, the dominant paradigm used to describe the interpretive 
work of circuit courts.  Under this model, circuit courts use Supreme 
Court decisions as their primary source of authority for interpreting 
the Constitution and rely on standard methods of common law 
reasoning as their primary method of interpretation.  While the 
precedent model has a strong basis in constitutional values and 
practice, it fails to provide adequate guidance in areas where circuit 
courts have interpretive discretion.  Moreover, this discretionary 
space28 is expanding, making it increasingly difficult for circuit judges 
to rely upon the precedent model to guide their interpretive choices. 
Part II argues that in areas where circuit courts have interpretive 
discretion, they operate as percolators for constitutional policy, and 
that the percolation process serves a set of competing constitutional 
values that are in tension with the precedent model.  Existing models 
of lower court constitutionalism ask circuit courts to interpret the 
Constitution in ways that align with either the preferences of the 
Supreme Court or the theorist’s own interpretive agenda.  Both 
approaches stifle this critical percolation function by homogenizing 
circuit court decision making, and make it difficult for the 
interpretive system to benefit from its partially decentralized 
structure.  
Part III explores a different model of lower court constitutionalism, 
one in which circuit courts help the interpretive system maintain 
stability while still evolving to meet the needs of a changing 
environment.  It uses complexity theory to suggest that circuit courts 
are part of a complex adaptive system of interpretation and that the 
                                                          
 27. See infra Parts III.B., IV.B. 
 28. Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 409 (2007).  
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principles that govern complex adaptive systems might be helpful in 
determining how circuit courts should make interpretive choices in a 
climate of uncertainty and dynamic change.   
Part IV applies some of the principles of complexity theory to the 
interpretive work of circuit courts by focusing on two dynamics—
variation and interdependence—that help complex adaptive systems 
arrive at the “sweet spot” between rigid behavior on one hand and 
random behavior on the other.  This Part argues that theories of 
lower court constitutionalism should spend more time considering 
methods to adjust the level of variation among circuit courts and the 
ways in which circuits communicate and influence one another.  
Within a complex adaptive system of interpretation, it is far less 
important that circuit courts arrive at the “best” answer or an answer 
that aligns with the Supreme Court’s policy preferences, and far 
more important that they arrive at answers that are different from 
one another and are able to influence one another’s behavior.  Like 
any ecosystem, diversity and interdependence help the interpretive 
system adapt and ensure its long-term survival. 
I. THE PRECEDENT MODEL AND DISCRETIONARY SPACE 
For federal judges that serve on the nation’s thirteen circuit courts 
of appeals, judicial hierarchy and constitutional interpretation are 
inseparable.  Under what Evan Caminker calls the “precedent 
model,” these judges resolve constitutional cases “based on their best 
current understanding of the law” by identifying relevant legal 
authority and then using established interpretive methods to apply 
that authority to a given case.29  In practice, this means that circuit 
court judges deciding constitutional cases use Supreme Court 
decisions as their primary source of legal authority.30  Then, relying 
upon time-honored methods of common law reasoning, they apply 
these decisions to different sets of facts.31  
The precedent model is constitutional theory’s dominant 
                                                          
 29. Caminker, supra note 24, at 8–9 (internal quotations omitted). 
 30. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 903, 912 (2005) (“The fact is that the most cited source in constitutional 
adjudication is precedent.”); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in 
Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 76 (1991) (stating 
that precedents are the traditional source of constitutional decision making). 
 31. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 877, 888–90 (1996) (discussing how constitutional interpretation is a common 
law tradition); see also Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 
651, 664 (1995) (stating that, under the prediction approach, lower court judges 
review the law and “ask[] what result the law requires, taking into account prior 
decisions and relevant legal arguments”). 
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interpretive paradigm for circuit courts.  Court of appeals judges 
figure out what the Constitution means by dutifully following and 
implementing the directives contained in Supreme Court opinions, 
and, by and large, this is seen as a good thing.  
In practice, the precedent model informs every aspect of the way 
circuit court judges interpret the Constitution.  As Sanford Levinson 
notes, “[t]he oath of constitutional fidelity, required of every public 
official by Article VI of the Constitution, is transformed, for the 
‘inferior’ judge, into a duty to obey the Supreme Court.”32  The 
model envisions these life-tenured judges as “infantry carrying out the 
marching orders of generals who sit on the court of last resort”33 with 
one primary objective:  to achieve the Court’s desired constitutional 
outcome34 or an outcome within the range of outcomes defined as 
acceptable by the Court.35  It is constitutional law made from the top-
down.36  
In turn, critics routinely slam the Court for failing to provide 
adequate guidance to lower court judges in its constitutional rulings, 
creating the potential for chaos by allowing these judges to interpret 
the Constitution without careful supervision.37  One prominent 
scholar recently took the Court to task for failing to perform its 
“guidance obligations” in constitutional cases, spotting a “growing 
tendency on the part of the Court to avoid issuing a clear, general, 
and subsequently usable statement of the Court’s reasoning or the 
Court’s view of the implications of its decision.”38 
                                                          
 32. Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants:  “Inferior” Judges and the Task 
of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843, 848 (1993). 
 33. Dorf, supra note 31, at 672. 
 34. See id. at 672–73 (explaining the mindset of lower court judges due to the 
hierarchical arrangement of the court system, which requires that lower court judges 
follow the orders of the higher courts and act as the higher courts would). 
 35. See McNollgast, Politics and the Courts:  A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and 
the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1641 (1995) (“To implement the idea of 
judicial doctrine, we assume that it consists of a statement about the range of lower 
court decisions acceptable to the Court on an issue of law.”). 
 36. Friedman, supra note 5, at 295. 
 37. See Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”?  An Empirical 
Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791214 (concluding 
that, when “‘significant room’ is opened for judicial discretion,” lower courts have 
the ability to decide cases in line with their “personal preferences and political 
leanings”); see also Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function:  Morse v. 
Frederick, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 207–08 (Dennis J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 
2008) (pointing out the Supreme Court’s recent tendency to produce narrow 
holdings, “providing virtually no assistance for lower courts”). 
 38. Schauer, supra note 37, at 207–08; see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law 
of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176–79 (1989) (arguing that the “discretion-
conferring approach” of common law is not suited for the Supreme Court that hears 
“an insignificant proportion of the decided cases”). 
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The precedent model’s top-down perspective narrows the focus of 
most constitutional theory.  If lower courts are grunts carrying out the 
general’s orders, there is little need to pay attention to them beyond 
making sure that they are carrying out those orders properly or 
ensuring that the Court provides them with sufficient guidance.  
From this vantage point, if one wants to understand how 
constitutional interpretation happens or how change occurs, the 
Supreme Court is the only institutional actor that matters.  And if you 
understand the Court, you understand the entire federal judicial 
system’s constitutional output. 
A. The Constitutional Basis for the Precedent Model 
The precedent model finds its strongest support in the text of the 
Constitution itself.  Article III vests the “judicial power” in “one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish,”39 while Article I establishes 
Congress’ power to create tribunals that are “inferior to the supreme 
Court.”40  
Thus, the Constitution establishes what many scholars have 
described as a “principal-agent” relationship between the Supreme 
Court and circuit courts,41 a top-down hierarchy that places the only 
court that was actually constituted by the Constitution itself at the top 
of the judicial heap and differentiates the “supreme” leader from the 
“inferior” pack.42 Within this framework, the Court (the “principal”) 
directs lower federal courts (the “agents”) to perform certain tasks 
and produce certain outcomes.43  The principal then spends a great 
deal of time trying to minimize the “agency costs” created by lower 
court agents who “shirk” their responsibilities by pursuing their own 
priorities in ways that depart from the principal’s goals and 
                                                          
 39. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; see Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts 
Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 828–34 (1994) (“[A]ll other 
Article III courts Congress chooses to create must be ‘inferior to’ the ‘supreme’ 
court.”). 
 41. See Susan Haire, Relations Among Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND POLITICS 506–07 (Keith E. Wittington et al. eds., 2008) (citing scholarship that 
employs agency theory to assess how lower and appellate federal courts interact); 
Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Federal Court System:  A Principal-Agent 
Perspective, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 819, 820 (2003) (analogizing delegation to lower 
federal courts to “the principal-agent model of economics”). 
 42. See Dorf, supra note 31, at 672 (“At the top sits the United States Supreme 
Court, created directly by the Constitution; all other federal courts exist at Congress’ 
pleasure and are ‘inferior’ to the Supreme Court.”).  For a more in-depth account of 
judicial hierarchy, see Caminker, supra note 40, at 856–72. 
 43. George & Yoon, supra note 41, at 820 (explaining that the Supreme Court 
controls lower courts through the power of reversal). 
GEWIRTZMAN.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  7:42 PM 
468 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:457 
directives.44  For lower court judges, shirking can be ideologically 
motivated, as when a judge follows her ideological preferences rather 
than governing Supreme Court doctrine.45  Or shirking can be a 
function of a judge’s desire to maximize other forms of utility, as 
when lower court judges issue quickly-drafted, poorly reasoned 
opinions to increase their leisure time.46  Scholars have spent a great 
deal of time trying to determine exactly how much “shirking” actually 
occurs47 and precisely how the Court is able to control “shirking” 
given that it only reviews a tiny percentage of cases decided by lower 
federal courts.48  
The Court has reinforced the precedent model by establishing an 
unambiguous bar on “anticipatory overruling.”49  Even if a circuit 
court judge has good reason to believe that the significance of a 
particular precedent has eroded over time or that the current Court 
would overrule the case, she must still comply with the Court’s earlier 
                                                          
 44. V. Nilakant & Hayagreeva Rao, Agency Theory and Uncertainty in Organizations:  
An Evaluation, 15 ORG. STUD. 649, 653 (1994). 
 45. George & Yoon, supra note 41, at 822. 
 46. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 22 (1993) (describing judicial “leisure-
serving” practices).   
 47. See Caminker, supra note 40, at 822 (offering insight into why lower court 
judges may issue opinions that conflict with those the Supreme Court would issue). 
 48. See Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled:  An Event History Analysis of 
Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534, 535–36 
(2002) (“The literature on judicial impact and compliance is voluminous, albeit 
somewhat contradictory.”); Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice:  Testing a 
Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 
692–94 (1994) (discussing the impact of Supreme Court precedent on lower court 
decisions); see also Susan B. Haire et al., Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal 
Judiciary:  A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 143, 144, 147 (2003) 
(“Although the power to reverse is exercised relatively infrequently by the circuit 
courts, it nevertheless serves as a compelling mechanism to shape lower court 
decision making . . . .”); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Judicial 
Compliance on the US Courts of Appeals, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 421, 422, 435–37 (2007) 
(arguing that fear of reversal can play a part in lower court decisions when someone 
threatens to act as a whistleblower); David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal 
as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579, 582 (2003) 
(listing several reasons why judges dislike being reversed); Stefanie A. Lindquist et 
al., Supreme Court Auditing of the US Courts of Appeals:  An Organizational Perspective, 17 J. 
PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH, 607, 621–22 (2007) (discussing how the Supreme Court has 
minimal decision-making resources with which to effectively “monitor and control 
varying lower court interpretations”); Kevin M. Scott, Understanding Judicial Hierarchy:  
Reversals and the Behavior of Intermediate Appellate Judges, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 164 
(2006) (commenting on whether lower court judges are motivated by their own 
personal views regarding what constitutes “good public policy”). 
 49. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (maintaining the Supreme 
Court’s authority to overrule lower court decisions); Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a precedent on this Court 
has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other 
line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case that directly controls, 
leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”). 
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decision.  This is true even if the Court has spoken in disparaging 
ways about its own past precedent or undermined that precedent’s 
core rationale but has failed to explicitly overrule the earlier case.  As 
one commentator put it, the bar on anticipatory overruling shows the 
Court’s “unwillingness to share its power to make new law . . . with 
other courts within the federal judiciary.”50  It sends a powerful 
message to lower courts about their ability to innovate and is often 
cited by circuit courts as a basis for declining to explore the potential 
interpretive implications of a newly minted Supreme Court decision.51 
The precedent model also serves larger constitutional objectives.  
Beyond the standard rule of law arguments invoked to support the 
use of vertical stare decisis (consistency and predictability),52 the 
precedent model helps to advance at least five pervasive 
constitutional values:  precommitment, judicial review, separation of 
powers, checks and balances, and fairness. 
1. The Constitution’s precommitment function   
Many scholars see the Constitution as a precommitment device,53 
locking a diverse and complex society into a shared set of institutions 
and values that exist across generations, transcend state borders, and 
are insulated from the unpredictable world of politics.  The 
precedent model helps to maintain these precommitments by 
enhancing what Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer call the 
Supreme Court’s “settlement function,”54 where the Court 
conclusively ends interpretive disputes by serving as the sole and final 
arbiter of constitutional meaning.  By situating resolution in a single 
                                                          
 50. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?:  The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal 
Courts, and the Nature of the “Judicial Power,” 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 977 (2000). 
 51. See, e.g., Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated sub nom. 
Maloney v. Rice, 130 S. Ct. 3541, 3541 (2010) (vacating judgment and remanding a 
Second Circuit decision “for consideration in light of McDonald v. Chicago”); Nat’l 
Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court 
justices have instructed lower court judges “to implement the Supreme Court’s 
holdings even if the reasoning in later opinions has undermined their rationale”); 
United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 153 (3d Cir. 2005) (invoking the 
bar on anticipatory overruling to restrict the impact of Lawrence on obscenity 
prosecutions).  But see Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 456–57 n.16 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(commenting on the lack of Supreme Court precedent “directly on point that bars us 
from heeding Heller’s suggestions”). 
 52. See Caminker, supra note 24, at 26–27 (asserting that “there are good 
consequentialistic reasons for the inferior courts to defer to the superior courts’ 
interpretation of the law rather than to devise their own interpretation”). 
 53. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND:  STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND 
CONSTRAINTS 117–18 (2000); JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME:  A THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 93–94 (2001). 
 54. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1377 (1997). 
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principal with judicial agents kept carefully in line, the Court 
solidifies constitutional precommitments by shutting down 
competing interpretive perspectives.55  In turn, this “authoritative 
settlement” defines and reinforces the precise terms of the 
precommitment over time and across institutions,56 as other actors—
including Congress, state legislatures, and administrative agencies—
structure their actions to comply with the Court-established 
constitutional norm.  
2. Legitimizing judicial review 
The precedent model also helps to legitimize the exercise of 
judicial review.  Constitutional interpretation often suffers from a 
widely held suspicion that judges are “legislating from the bench,” 
using their discretionary power and life tenure to impose their 
political will on a democratic system.57  The precedent model seeks to 
cabin interpretive discretion in a small number of federal judges that 
have a mandate to exercise “supreme” judicial power from the 
Constitution itself.  Each of them has been carefully screened by 
Congress, has developed a specialization in constitutional law, and—
unlike their inferior judicial peers—is subject to ongoing intensive 
scrutiny by the media and other national political actors.  This creates 
the perception of constitutional change as a project supervised by a 
small group of “experts” that operate under a unique set of political 
constraints as actors on a national stage.58  The result is that judicial 
review appears to look more like a politically constrained application 
of “law” and less like an unrestricted exercise of “political will.”59  
                                                          
 55. See id. (explaining that the need for laws and a constitution support the need 
for authority in an interpretive body). 
 56. See Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, supra note 30, at 976–77 
(explaining how “precedent helps to foster stability in constitutional law”); Gerhardt, 
The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, supra note 30, at 77 
(emphasizing that a court will retain more confidence if it provides persuasive 
justifications for its decisions and maintains popular precedents). 
 57. See, e.g., Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding of 
and Support for the Courts:  Survey Results, 95 GEO. L.J. 899, 900 (2007) (finding that 
75% of Americans believe a judge’s politics influences his or her ruling to “a great or 
moderate extent”).  
 58. See Or Bassok, The Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty, 26 J. L. & POL. 239, 254–55 
(2011) (discussing the public’s belief that the Court’s decisions are based on a 
process of legal reasoning free from political or philosophical pressures). 
 59. See Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain 
Novel Theory:  Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1157–58, 1187 
(2005) (demonstrating that the existence of precedent prevents judges from making 
decisions based solely on their own preferences). 
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3. Separation of powers 
The precedent model allows the judicial branch to speak with a 
clear unified voice on constitutional issues when it negotiates with 
and acts as a check upon the other co-equal branches of the federal 
government.  By consolidating the judicial branch’s power in a single 
principal—the United States Supreme Court—the judiciary enjoys 
greater bargaining power and legitimacy in confrontations with 
Congress and the Executive Branch than it would in a model that 
allowed for more diffuse interpretive authority among federal judges.  
This serves the larger objectives of a separation of powers system that 
utilizes institutional checks to guard against the concentration of too 
much power in a single branch. 
4. Checks and balances   
The Constitution invites volatility into the lawmaking process 
through the political branches.  Regularly scheduled presidential and 
congressional elections serve as periodic jolts to the status quo, as the 
electoral process gives the constitutional system regular opportunities 
to reflect dynamic changes in its environment.  By contrast, federal 
judges serve over the course of a lifetime, providing a source of 
stability and continuity to check the built-in electoral volatility of the 
democratic process.60  The precedent model helps the judiciary 
perform this function by centralizing the power to initiate doctrinal 
change in a single judicial actor.  This establishes the judiciary as a 
stabilizing force in lawmaking, and creates a strong institutional 
balance against volatility in other areas of the system. 
5. Fairness and equality 
Finally, the precedent model also advances substantive 
constitutional commitments to due process and equal protection.  It 
ensures that similarly situated litigants, institutions, and 
governmental officials are subjected to the same constitutional rules 
regardless of geographic location.61   
                                                          
 60. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1635, 1648 
(1995) (arguing that regular elections “protect against the dominance of public 
interest parasites by constantly reshuffling their targets.”); Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra 
note 25, at 1473–74 (comparing special interest groups to parasites and arguing that 
the separation of powers maintains a government resistant to such parasites). 
 61. Cf. Friedman, supra note 5, at 296 (stating that “scholars rarely question the 
compliant role of lower courts” because the “hierarchical conception is driven by the 
imperative that ‘like cases should be treated alike’”). 
GEWIRTZMAN.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  7:42 PM 
472 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:457 
B. Circuit Court Discretion 
Despite a sound basis in constitutional law and policy, the 
precedent model has a major limitation:  it does not tell circuit 
judges how to interpret the Constitution when the Supreme Court 
fails to provide clear guidance.  As Pauline Kim describes it, lower 
court judges often make decisions within a “discretionary space” 
where they are routinely presented with opportunities to “exercise . . . 
choice . . . subject to certain constraints” created by legal rules.62  This 
“discretionary space” places limits on the value of a precedent model 
that positions lower court agents as simple mouthpieces for carrying 
out the principal’s directives.63  Even when the Supreme Court has 
spoken, lower courts have to make interpretive choices about 
whether a new Supreme Court ruling is applied broadly or narrowly, 
the extent to which the Court has overruled certain aspects of prior 
cases, or whether the new precedent applies to a diverse set of factual 
scenarios.64 
Indeed, circuit courts often find themselves empowered with 
flexibility about how to define a constitutional rule articulated in a 
precedential decision or its application to a particular set of facts.65  
Supreme Court opinions do not lay out the Court’s desired outcome 
in every possible case where the opinion’s rule might apply, and the 
Court does not clarify every potential conflict with earlier 
precedents.66  Moreover, opinions may contain directives that are 
intentionally vague as a mechanism to manage or smooth over 
potential tensions between the outcomes desired by the Court and its 
lower court agents.67  
                                                          
 62. Kim, supra note 28, at 409.  
 63. See id. at 440 (pointing out “the centralizing tendency of the principal-agent 
model”). 
 64. See Wald, supra note 5, at 778 (recognizing the importance of lower federal 
court explication of new Supreme Court rulings). 
 65. See Kim, supra note 28, at 411 (discussing the impact of the Supreme Court’s 
policy direction on lower court decision making); Lindquist et al., supra note 48, at 
607–08 (discussing the impact of a small caseload on “the Supreme Court’s ability to 
monitor and control varying lower court interpretations”); see also Maureen N. 
Armour, Federal Courts as Constitutional Laboratories:  The Rat’s Point of View, 57 DRAKE 
L. REV. 135, 226 (2008) (“The indeterminate or malleable nature of constitutional 
law does not simply create a legal black hole filled by the local judges’ personal, 
political, or policy preferences; instead, it allows the lower federal courts to shape 
our constitutional world.”); Lindquist & Cross, supra note 59, at 1200 (discussing the 
constraining effect of precedent on lower court judges’ decision making and noting 
that “the constraining effect does not appear to grow as precedents mount”); Wald, 
supra note 5, at 778 (“Like the elegant Bellamy family of Upstairs, Downstairs, in their 
Belgravia townhouse, the Justices are not equipped to do the clean-up work.”). 
 66. Jeffrey R. Lax, Political Constraints on Legal Doctrine:  How Hierarchy Shapes Law, 
J. POL. (forthcoming).  
 67. See Jeffrey K. Staton & Georg Vanberg, The Value of Vagueness:  Delegation, 
GEWIRTZMAN.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012 7:42 PM 
2012] LOWER COURT CONSTITUTIONALISM 473 
This leaves room for circuit court discretion to take many forms, 
including occasional departures from the Supreme Court’s desired 
course of action.  At times, a “more subtle subterranean defiance” by 
lower federal courts takes hold; “means such as reading Supreme 
Court holdings narrowly, denying the logical implications of a 
holding, or treating significant parts of opinions as dicta, [are] far 
from unusual.”68  
Constitutional law’s indeterminacy problem is a major source of 
discretionary space.  As Michael Gerhardt notes, the constitutional 
text “is open-ended, lacks consensus on rules for its construction, and 
is subject to multiple interpretations.”69  When it comes to 
adjudicating constitutional disputes:  “[t]he Court has no rules for 
determining the breadth or narrowness of a particular ruling . . . the 
proper way to prioritize sources of decision, or the best method of 
reading prior cases, including the appropriate level of generality at 
which to state the principles set forth within precedents.”70   
Discretionary space is also created when principals other than the 
Supreme Court affect the agents’ action.  Circuit courts operate in an 
organizational environment where multiple principals and multiple 
agents exercise influence over one another.71  The presence of 
different institutional actors with divergent goals makes it difficult to 
determine exactly whose goals the agent is supposed to carry out, 
which of those multiple goals should take priority, or which entity is 
ultimately responsible for monitoring certain aspects of the agent’s 
behavior.72  For example, studies suggest circuit judges are responsive 
to the preferences of many institutional players, including the 
circuit’s own en banc preferences, earlier decisions made by the 
circuit, the policy preferences of the appointing president and home 
                                                          
Defiance, and Judicial Opinions, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 504, 504–05 (2008) (arguing that 
“vagueness enables judges to deal with their limited policymaking abilities in an 
uncertain world” and “build and maintain institutional prestige in the face of 
potential opposition”). 
 68. Bhagwat, supra note 50, at 986; see also id. at 987–92 (providing examples of 
“lower court evasion of longstanding precedent”). 
 69. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, supra note 30, at 939; see 
Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 877 
(2003) (stating that “indeterminacy opens the way to judicial discretion”). 
 70. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, supra note 30, at 957. 
 71. See Kim, supra note 20, at 563 (questioning whether lower courts owe a duty 
to principals other than the Supreme Court). 
 72. See James C. Brent, An Agent and Two Principals:  U.S. Court of Appeals Responses 
to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 27 AM. POL. Q. 236, 238, 242 (1999) (discussing the challenges 
that occur when agents are employed by multiple principals); Richard W. Waterman 
& Kenneth J. Meier, Principal-Agent Models:  An Expansion?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & 
THEORY 173, 180–81 (1998) (providing an overview of some of the problems that 
arise when multiple principals are introduced). 
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state senators, Congress, and repeat-player litigants.73  Rather than a 
simple principal-agent relationship where the circuit judges only pay 
attention to the Court, the full picture involves a range of interests 
and influences that affect constitutional outcomes.74 
C. The Growing Discretionary Space in Constitutional Law 
Beyond indeterminacy and the existence of multiple principals, 
there are reasons to believe that circuit courts’ “discretionary space” 
is expanding.  A series of Court-driven trends have created 
opportunities for lower courts to exercise a wider range of discretion 
in constitutional cases:  (1) judicial minimalism, (2) the use of 
standards instead of rules, (3) “stealth overruling,” and (4) the use of 
plurality opinions.   
First, judicial minimalism—adopting narrow constitutional rulings 
that decide the case under review rather than issuing broad directives 
that affect a large number of other potential conflicts75—continues to 
drive the Court’s approach to many core areas of constitutional 
doctrine.76  While “leaving things undecided”77 may promote 
democratic resolution by limiting the scope of the Court’s 
involvement, it also provides greater opportunities for lower courts to 
exercise discretion.78  Fact-specific rulings allow circuit courts to 
adopt fact-based distinctions to avoid the logical implications of a 
given ruling, and the minimalist preference for “incompletely 
                                                          
 73. See Haire, supra note 41, at 511–12 (summarizing studies examining the 
influence of other institutional actors on circuit court decision making); Robert J. 
Hume, Courting Multiple Audiences:  The Strategic Selection of Legal Groundings by Judges 
on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 14, 29 (2009) (concluding that lower court 
judges take into account “the preferences of multiple actors” when “choosing legal 
groundings such as the arbitrary and capricious standard”); Pauline T. Kim, 
Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals:  An Empirical Exploration of 
Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1367–68 (2009) (discussing some of the 
weaknesses of the principal-agent model of judicial hierarchy); Arthur S. Leonard, 
Exorcising the Ghosts of Bowers v. Hardwick:  Uprooting Invalid Precedents, 84 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 519, 556–57 (2009) (condemning circuit courts’ continued reliance on their 
previous rulings based on a subsequently overruled case); Chad Westerland et al., 
Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 891, 
902–03 (2010) (concluding that a circuit’s earlier treatment of Supreme Court 
precedent exerts strong influence over the circuit court’s later behavior).  
 74. See Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. 
POL. SCI. 203, 211 (2005) (describing the problem of multiple principals). 
 75. CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:  JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 10 (1999). 
 76. Robert Anderson IV, Measuring Meta-Doctrine:  An Empirical Assessment of 
Judicial Minimalism in the Supreme Court, 32 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 1045, 1049–50 
(2009). 
 77. SUNSTEIN, supra note 75, at 3. 
 78. See Schauer, supra note 37, at 207–08 (arguing that the Court’s trend toward 
judicial minimalism necessarily requires it to abandon its guidance function). 
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theorized agreements”79 over conclusive resolution leaves wide room 
for interpretation about the implications of a given decision.80  
Further, the minimalist (and current Court’s) preference for “as-
applied rather than facial [constitutional] challenges” relies on 
factually dependent, case-by-case distinctions that are generally made 
by lower courts, providing even more opportunities for discretion.81  
Second, the Court’s widespread use of standards (as opposed to 
bright-line rules) to resolve constitutional disputes82 creates 
discretionary space for lower courts to determine how those 
standards are applied.83  For example, Adam Winkler has shown that, 
despite doctrine holding that the same standard of review should 
apply under the First and Fourteenth Amendments regardless of 
whether the law in question was adopted by federal, state, or local 
governments, lower federal courts grant far greater deference to 
federal affirmative action laws and restrictions on free speech than 
they do when the government actor is a state or local government.84  
Winkler has also shown that lower courts can alter commonly held 
assumptions about the application of constitutional standards.85  For 
example, it is generally assumed that once the Supreme Court has 
                                                          
 79. Anderson, supra note 76, at 1052. 
 80. See Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 658–59 (2004) 
(showing that, when Court rulings were “incoherent,” lower court decisions became 
“unpredictable”). 
 81. Schauer, supra note 37, at 230–31. 
 82. See Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, supra note 30, at 946–48 
(detailing the relatively few judgments the Supreme Court has framed as rules rather 
than standards). 
 83. Schauer, supra note 37, at 207; see Bhagwat, supra note 50, at 990–91 (citing 
the Court’s movement toward standards as “a lessening of the Court’s control over 
lower court decision-making”); Brannon P. Denning, The New Doctrinalism in 
Constitutional Scholarship and District of Columbia v. Heller, 75 TENN. L. REV. 789, 793, 
795 (2008) (arguing that the study of the Supreme Court’s doctrinal formation 
provides important evidence as to how the lower courts apply these doctrines); Rick 
Pildes, Caperton and The Supreme Court’s Boundary-Enforcing Role, BALKINIZATION (June 
8, 2009),  http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/caperton-and-supreme-courts- 
boundary.html (describing the tension between the argument that, if the Court 
cannot define a bright-line rule, it has no “sound, principled, indeed legal basis for 
acting” and the view that “some lines cannot be crossed, even if it is legally impossible 
to define those lines with clarity”); see also Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial 
Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 
1517–27 (2008) (finding that the use of standards increases judicial discretion in 
lower courts’ application of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).   
 84. Winkler, The Federal Government as a Constitutional Niche in Affirmative Action 
Cases, supra note 13, at 1933; see also Winkler, Free Speech Federalism, supra note 13, at 
154–55 (finding that “speech restrictions adopted by the federal government are far 
more likely to be upheld than speech restrictions adopted by other levels of 
government”). 
 85. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact:  An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 826 (2006) (demonstrating the 
“survival rate” of cases examined under strict scrutiny varied depending on the 
federal court level). 
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directed its agents to apply strict scrutiny to a given law, the law is not 
likely to survive constitutional review.86  Winkler’s work disputes this 
proposition, showing that federal courts applying a strict scrutiny 
standard from 1990 to 2003 upheld the challenged law 30% of the 
time.87 
Third, the Court’s recent habit of “stealth overruling”—failing to 
extend a precedent to its logical conclusion or reducing its value as 
precedent without explicitly overturning the case88—shifts 
interpretive power to lower courts.  In a range of constitutional 
areas—the dormant commerce clause, student speech, standing, 
abortion, and affirmative action, to name a few—the Court has been 
accused of undermining its own past precedents without providing an 
adequate basis to explain the distinctions it attempts to draw.89  This 
behavior creates opportunities for lower courts to exercise discretion 
by undermining the continued authority of older precedent, relying 
on distinctions that may not withstand scrutiny when lower courts are 
called upon to put them into practice, or providing doctrinal 
authority to support a wider range of potential outcomes.90 
Finally, the Court’s reliance on plurality decisions—cases where a 
majority of justices agree in the judgment but where no single 
rationale captures five votes—to resolve critical constitutional 
disputes expands lower court discretion as well.91  In a recent study, 
Pamela Corley concluded that lower courts are more likely to treat 
plurality opinions negatively and less likely to give them positive 
treatment.92  This is attributable to the uncertainty surrounding their 
authority, which creates a fertile environment for interpretive 
                                                          
 86. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword:  In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1, 8 (1972) (coining the famous term “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact” 
regarding the standard of review for a statutory infringement of fundamental 
constitutional rights). 
 87. Winkler, supra note 85, at 794–96. 
 88. Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to 
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 15–16 (2010). 
 89. Id. at 13–14.  
 90. See id. at 16–17 (using the “disappearing Miranda rule” as an example). 
 91. See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008) (plurality 
opinion) (eight separate opinions filed); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 
U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion) (four separate opinions filed); Baze v. Rees, 553 
U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality opinion) (seven separate opinions filed); Parents Involved 
in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (plurality opinion) (five 
separate opinions filed); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (plurality opinion) 
(six separate opinions filed); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality 
opinion) (four separate opinions filed); see also Wald, supra note 5, at 783 
(explaining the problems that arise when there is no majority opinion). 
 92. Pamela C. Corley, Uncertain Precedent:  Circuit Court Responses to Supreme Court 
Plurality Opinions, 37 AM. POL. RES. 30, 44 (2009). 
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discretion.93  Corley’s finding has particular significance for 
constitutional law:  David Straus and James Spriggs concluded that 
plurality opinions are 200% more likely to occur in constitutional 
cases than in cases involving statutory interpretation,94 and far more 
likely to occur in cases with a civil rights or civil liberties component.95  
The question of how much authority to grant to plurality opinions 
(or which of the multiple opinions is ultimately binding) creates 
additional opportunities for lower courts to make important choices 
about constitutional meaning.96  
D. Empirical Studies of Discretionary Space 
The existence of discretionary space has created a growing cottage 
industry of empirical studies to determine how circuit judges utilize 
that space.  Do they follow the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
directives?  In what areas and under what conditions are they most 
likely to exercise interpretive discretion?  What factors influence how 
circuit judges decide cases?  
At the most general level, the precedent model describes what 
federal circuit judges actually do:  they comply with Supreme Court 
precedent, and they do so even though the chances of review and 
reversal are extremely slim (since the Supreme Court only hears 
roughly 0.02% of the cases filed in federal courts).97  By and large, 
empirical research has shown that lower federal courts act “as faithful 
agents of their higher court principals” in that they tend to follow 
higher court precedent.98  Indeed, “no work has found systemic non-
compliance among lower courts of the decision-making of higher 
                                                          
 93. Id. at 35; Schauer, supra note 37, at 231–32. 
 94. James F. Spriggs II & David R. Straus, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. 
L.J. 515, 547 (2011). 
 95. Corley, supra note 92, at 32. 
 96. See Friedman, supra note 88, at 46–50 (describing lower court confusion over 
how to address the Court’s plurality opinions). 
 97. Clifford Carrubba & Tom S. Clark, Rule Creation in a Political Hierarchy, 1 
(2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1596304.  
 98. THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 109–10 (2006); Klein & Hume, supra note 48, at 579; see 
Christina L. Boyd & James F. Spriggs II, An Examination of Strategic Anticipation of 
Appellate Court Preferences By Federal District Court Judges, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 51 
(2009) (reviewing empirical studies to find “overwhelming evidence of compliance”); 
Kim, supra note 73, at 1368 (finding that lower court judges follow Supreme Court 
doctrine despite ideological differences); see also Kastellec, supra note 48, at 423 
(explaining that, despite the Court’s inability to compel compliance, studies have 
found widespread compliance by lower courts); Richard L. Pacelle, Jr. & Lawrence 
Baum, Supreme Court Authority in the Judiciary:  A Study of Remands, 20 AM. POL. Q. 169, 
186 (1992) (concluding that the Supreme Court “possesses real authority for judges 
on lower courts, authority that influences their responses to its decisions”). 
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federal appellate courts”99 and there is “little evidence of outright 
defiance” by courts of appeals.100  Some of this research has focused 
on lower court compliance with Court-initiated shifts in 
constitutional doctrine; the research shows corresponding shifts in 
case outcomes at the lower court level following Supreme Court 
decisions that changed applicable constitutional rules.101 
Yet there are limits to what the “compliance studies” reveal about 
discretionary space.102  The studies generally do not attempt to 
measure “underruling”—cases where a Supreme Court precedent 
potentially applies but where the lower court decides it does not 
apply to the case at bar.103  Nor do the studies fully measure the ways 
that circuit courts apply standards of review and the level of 
                                                          
 99. Boyd & Spriggs, supra note 98, at 51. 
 100. Benesh & Reddick, supra note 48, at 536. 
 101. See id. at 547–48 (finding that lower courts generally adopted Warren Court 
precedents that overruled existing precedent, though the speed at which compliance 
took place varied depending upon several factors, including the age of the overruled 
decision and the degree of Court consensus in the overruling decision); Brent, supra 
note 72, at 254 (finding that lower courts were “significantly less receptive to free 
exercise claims” in the aftermath of the Court’s decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)); Jennifer K. Luse et al., “Such Inferior Courts . . .”:  
Compliance by Circuits with Jurisprudential Regimes, 37 AM. POL. RES. 75, 92 (2009) 
(finding that lower courts dutifully applied the regime established by the Court in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), to deal with Establishment Clause claims); 
Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of 
Judicial Voting:  Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 963, 974–
75 (1992) (finding that a Court-initiated shift in First Amendment obscenity doctrine 
had a substantial effect on lower court case outcomes); Donald R. Songer & Reginald 
S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on Compliance and Outcomes:  Miranda and New York 
Times in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 WESTERN POL. Q. 297, 306–09 (1990) 
(describing lower court compliance with the Court’s First Amendment libel decision 
in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and its decision expanding 
constitution protections for criminal defendants in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), though lower court compliance did not necessarily shift case outcomes).  
There are numerous other studies showing general compliance in other subject 
areas, in procedural contexts, and among state courts.  See, e.g., John Gruhl, The 
Supreme Court’s Impact on the Law of Libel:  Compliance by Lower Federal Courts, 33 WEST. 
POL. Q. 502, 517 (1980) (finding consistent compliance by district courts and courts 
of appeals with the Court’s libel precedents); Valerie Hoekstra, Competing Constraints:  
State Court Responses to Supreme Court Decisions and Legislation on Wages and Hours, 58 
POL. RES. Q. 317, 326 (2005) (finding that state courts “may act as agents of the 
Supreme Court in much the same way as do judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeal”); 
Pacelle & Baum, supra note 98, at 186 (studying the impact of Court remands and 
concluding “that the Court’s authority is a significant force in both the federal and 
state judicial systems”); Donald R. Songer, Alternative Approaches to the Study of Judicial 
Impact:  Miranda in Five State Courts, 16 AM. POL. Q. 425, 439 (1988) (finding 
“[f]ormal acceptance of the binding character of the Miranda precedent” as the 
norm in five state supreme courts); Donald R. Songer, The Impact of the Supreme Court 
on Trends in Economic Policy Making in the United States Courts of Appeals, 49 J. POL. 830, 
839 (1987) (concluding that “the Supreme Court exercises considerable impact on 
the general trends in economic policy-making in the United States Courts of 
Appeals”).  
 102. Friedman, supra note 5, at 300. 
 103. Caminker, supra note 24, at 63.  
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deference they apply to findings by trial courts, which can have a 
dramatic impact on case outcomes while still remaining consistent 
with the Court’s directives.104   
Most importantly, the compliance studies do not fully account for 
studies showing the impact of extra-legal factors on how circuit 
judges vote, including the judge’s ideology.  While the influence of 
judicial ideology on circuit court decision making appears to be quite 
modest when compared with other factors, like the force of law105—
indeed, 85% of published appellate opinions are unanimous106—
there is substantial evidence showing that it affects constitutional 
outcomes within a small range of highly contentious subject-matter 
areas.107  For example, in a 2006 study that examined over 6000 
published Federal Court of Appeals panel decisions in doctrinal areas 
selected for their controversial nature (and therefore, increased 
likelihood of ideological effects), Cass Sunstein and his co-authors 
discovered significant evidence of ideological influence over voting 
by circuit judges in a range of constitutionally salient areas, including 
abortion, capital punishment, affirmative action, campaign finance, 
the Eleventh Amendment, and obscenity.108  In several other areas, 
though, the study found an absence of ideological effects:  the party 
of the president that appointed the judge had limited effect on how 
appellate judges voted in cases involving the Takings Clause, the 
Commerce Clause, criminal appeals, whether a particular litigant has 
standing, or Due Process challenges to punitive damages awards.109 
Similarly, Michael Heise and Gregory Sisk examined all 
                                                          
 104. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1111–12 (2011). 
 105. In a comprehensive 2007 study of over 27,000 votes made by federal appellate 
judges from 1925 to 1992, Frank Cross found a statistically significant association 
between ideology and voting but concluded that the effect was a “small one.”  FRANK 
B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 38 (2007).  He also 
concluded that ideological influence varied depending upon subject matter, with 
“due process” cases showing the largest effect.  Id. at 28.  At the same time, he 
concluded that constitutional cases as a group had a comparatively low level of 
ideological influence, particularly when compared with cases involving federal 
statutory interpretation and found no statistically significant relationship between 
outcomes and ideology in cases involving First Amendment and privacy issues. Id. at 
27–29; see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior:  A 
Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 807 (2009) (concluding that ideology has a 
greater effect on Supreme Court voting than circuit court voting in constitutional 
cases due to the high number of non-meritorious cases heard on mandatory appeal 
by lower appellate courts).  
 106. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 685, 709 (2009). 
 107. CROSS, supra note 105, at 26–27 (describing various studies in which ideology 
was found to have a significant effect on circuit court decision making). 
 108. CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?  AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 24–40, 54–57 (2006). 
 109. Id. at 48–54. 
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Establishment Clause cases decided by federal court of appeals and 
district court judges from 1996 to 2005.  They concluded that 
ideology had a significant impact on how lower court judges vote 
within this subset of constitutional cases, even while acknowledging 
that “ideology explains only a relatively modest part of judicial 
behavior and emerges on the margins in controversial and 
ideologically contested cases.”110 
The influence of ideology on how circuit judges vote provides 
evidence that circuit courts operate with discretionary space in 
certain areas of constitutional law.  But ideological factors are only 
part of the story.  Other studies have found a range of extra-legal 
influences on circuit judge voting behavior, including the existence 
of consensus norms within circuits,111 the circuit’s overall ideology112 
and workload,113 strategic responses to the preferences of other 
institutional actors,114 or the presence of repeat litigants.115  Each of 
these dynamics suggest that, despite a circuit judge’s understandable 
reluctance to overtly defy the Supreme Court and the widespread 
acceptance of the precedent model, the judge can and does make 
interpretive choices within certain subject areas about what the 
Constitution means and how it applies.116 
The growing discretionary space and the influence of forces 
outside the principal-agent relationship suggest that, at the very least, 
constitutional scholarship must pay greater attention to the 
                                                          
 110. Sisk & Heise, supra note 37, at 66.  For other studies on the influence of 
ideology on circuit court voting, see Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The 
Phantom Philosophy?  An Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REV. 
841, 883 (2006) (finding no significant ideological influences in non-unanimous 
cases decided by a single federal circuit) and see also DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 116–17 (2003) 
(finding greater ideological influence in civil rights cases than in labor and economic 
regulation cases); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and 
Obedience to Legal Doctrine:  Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 
2155, 2156 (1998) (concluding that the presence of a judge whose ideology differs 
from the majority’s is a “significant determinant of whether judges will perform their 
designated role as principled legal decisionmakers”); Richard L. Revesz, 
Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 
(1997) (finding that ideology significantly influences judicial decision making on the 
D.C. Circuit and that a judge’s vote is “greatly affected” by the ideology of the other 
judges on the panel). 
 111. Joshua B. Fischman, Understanding Voting Behavior in Circuit Court Panels, 4 
(Northwestern Law Searle Center, 2010), available at http://www.law.northwestern 
.edu/searlecenter/papers/Fischman_voting_behavior.pdf. 
 112. Landes & Posner, supra note 105, at 803–07. 
 113. Huang, supra note 104, at 1112–13. 
 114. Fischman, supra note 111, at 3. 
 115. SONGER ET AL. supra note 110. 
 116. Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Cases, 26 J.L. & POL. 123, 
123–24 (2011).   
GEWIRTZMAN.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012 7:42 PM 
2012] LOWER COURT CONSTITUTIONALISM 481 
interpretive work of circuit courts.  Judge-made constitutional law is 
not simply the product of a single principal conveying its message 
through the rigid hierarchy of the precedent model.  Instead, it is the 
product of a complex interpretive system where a large number of 
agents operating at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use their 
discretion to define its content. 
II. THE NORMATIVE FUNCTION OF DISCRETIONARY SPACE:  
POLICYMAKING THROUGH PERCOLATION 
While discretionary space may create problems for the precedent 
model, it provides a terrain for lower courts to make constitutional 
policy. This policymaking function serves a competing set of 
constitutional values, most of which are summarily dismissed in 
models of how lower courts should exercise the discretion they have.  
This suggests the need for a new approach to lower court 
constitutionalism, one that recognizes the full set of normative values 
advanced by an interpretive system that empowers lower courts to 
make choices about constitutional meaning. 
A. Policymaking and Error Correction 
The precedent model advances the circuit courts’ primary 
constitutional function:  error correction.117  This function requires 
appellate courts to ensure that decisions made by trial courts and 
agencies within their jurisdiction comply with established law and 
contain no clearly erroneous findings of fact.  
The precedent model, and the corresponding hierarchical 
relationship between the Supreme Court and the circuits, enables 
circuit court judges to perform their error correction role 
efficiently.118  To “correct” errors, there must be some benchmark of 
what constitutes a “correct” interpretation.119 Within constitutional 
law, there are numerous potential sources of authority with no 
consensus about how to prioritize or interpret those authorities.120  
The precedent model focuses lower courts on a single source of 
authority and interpretive methodology:  the application of Supreme 
                                                          
 117. Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L. J. 49, 49 (2010).  See generally 
Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 
381 (1995) (arguing that the appeals process as a form of error correction is more 
economical than improving the accuracy of the trial process). 
 118. See generally Shavell, supra note 117, at 381 (recognizing that the appeals 
process “allows society to . . . reduce the incidence of mistake at low cost”). 
 119. See Oldfather, supra note 117, at 52 (describing the difficulties associated with 
defining error and explaining what it means to correct it). 
 120. See Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, supra note 30, at 939.  
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Court precedent through common law reasoning.121  This 
dramatically shrinks the scope of relevant authority and allows 
appellate court judges to apply the same familiar methodology used 
in other areas of law.  For lower courts, the model resolves the critical 
questions of constitutional interpretation—what authority to use and 
how to interpret that authority—in a clear and efficient way. 
If the precedent model is a way of structuring organizational 
relationships to help lower courts fulfill their error correction 
function, discretionary space helps them perform a second 
institutional function:  policymaking.122  Unlike the error correction 
function, which creates law from the top down, the policymaking 
function envisions law made from the bottom up, created through a 
dialogue between different levels of the federal judiciary.  
In areas where the Supreme Court has not spoken, or where it is 
unclear whether or how existing law applies, circuit courts act as 
“percolators” for the development of constitutional law.  Before the 
Court chooses to nationalize a particular constitutional rule, it gets a 
chance to see how the rule “writes,”123 and the opportunity to use 
lower courts as smaller “laboratories”124 for experimentation to assess 
the rule’s consequences.125  Through the percolation process, the 
federal judicial system harnesses the benefits of “[t]he wide diversity 
of skills, experience, and backgrounds” among lower courts to 
                                                          
 121. See Strauss, supra note 31, at 883 (noting that, in deciding a constitutional 
issue, the Court looks to doctrine, or an “elaborate structure of precedents built up 
over time,” rather than text).  
 122. SONGER ET AL., supra note 115, at 14–15; Armour, supra note 65, at 148.  
Federal appellate courts also serve a range of other subsidiary functions.  Through 
their supervision of trial courts, they harmonize intra-circuit conflicts among district 
courts, and prospectively prevent errors by trial judges who are subject to the 
prospect of mandatory review.  Shavell, supra note 117, at 425–26.  From the 
Supreme Court’s perspective, circuit courts ease the burden on the Supreme Court’s 
appellate docket by taking responsibility for hearing mandatory appeals, and 
enhance the Court’s authority by dutifully enforcing its mandates.  See J. WOODFORD 
HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM:  A STUDY OF THE 
SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 5 (1981) (describing the function 
of the circuit courts as a means of providing relief to the Supreme Court’s congested 
docket and uniformity to the proceedings of diverse federal trial courts); Shavell, 
supra note 117, at 425–26 (delineating the functions of the appeals process).  Finally, 
simply by hearing appeals regardless of their merit, appellate courts reinforce public 
perceptions about the fairness and legitimacy of the judicial process.  SONGER ET AL., 
supra note 110, at 14. 
 123. Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s 
Responsibilities:  An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 719 n.148 (1984).  
 124. See McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) (“[I]t is a sound exercise of 
discretion for the Court to allow [lower courts] to serve as laboratories in which the 
issue receives further study before it is addressed by this Court.”). 
 125. Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 123, at 699 n.68, 727; see J. Clifford Wallace, 
The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts:  A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a 
Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913, 929 (1983); Westerland et al., supra note 73, at 903.   
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produce optimal rules,126 as well as internalizing the benefits of the 
deliberation that occurs among lower courts as they respond to one 
another’s decisions.127  Indeed, the release of a new Supreme Court 
opinion often ushers in a “period of learning within the circuits,” in 
which different lower courts follow different doctrinal paths, 
culminating in the Supreme Court selecting one of the alternatives 
and nationalizing it.128  Once the process is completed, it has the 
potential to bring added legitimacy to judge-made constitutional law.  
When judges on multiple diverse courts converge on the same 
outcome, the rule is more likely to be seen as the correct one.129 
While percolation may have value in a range of legal contexts, it is 
especially critical to the development of constitutional doctrine.  
Unlike statutory interpretation, where Congress can always step in 
and correct an errant Court interpretation by amending the statute,130 
the Constitution’s elaborate and resource-intensive Article V 
amendment procedure is the only formal method for overturning the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional rulings.131  As a result, constitutional 
decisions tend to stick around for a long time,132 making it 
particularly important for the Court to “have the benefit of as much 
thinking on the question as is feasible” before it arrives at a definitive 
interpretation.133  
                                                          
 126. Wald, supra note 5, at 793. 
 127. See Estriecher & Sexton, supra note 123, at 699 n.68 (proposing that 
percolation “encourages the courts of appeals to examine and criticize each other’s 
decisions, which . . . can generate solutions that are not obvious on a first or second 
look”). 
 128. Westerland et al., supra note 73, at 903. 
 129. See Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions and Institutional Design, 97 VA. L. REV. 
1435, 1456–57 (2011) (suggesting that a conforming second opinion provides 
legitimacy to the decision and increases the decisionmaker’s confidence). 
 130. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1609 (2008) 
(positing that Congress seeks to resolve circuit splits to “ensure[] that its statutes are 
applied uniformly throughout the country” (citation omitted)); Daniel J. Meador, A 
Challenge to Judicial Architecture:  Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 633–34 (1989) (explaining that, where Congress has 
spoken on a matter, it is “important for the judiciary to implement congressional 
intent in a straightforward, clear manner”). 
 131. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 422, 430 (1988) (discussing the difficulty in amending the 
Constitution as conducive to ensuring the government’s stability); Meador, supra 
note 130, at 633; Wald, supra note 5, at 791–92. 
 132. Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive:  The Nature and Function of 
Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1293 (2004) (describing constitutional law as 
“sticky”).  There are, of course, exceptions.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
578 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and asserting that 
“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, [and] is not correct today”); Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling Nat’l League of 
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).  
 133. Meador, supra note 130, at 633. 
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B. Percolation’s Constitutional Benefits 
Percolation’s value remains highly contested, even though very 
little is actually known about how percolation actually operates within 
constitutional law or the extent to which the interpretive system 
benefits from prolonged periods of circuit court exploration and 
experimentation.134  Percolation’s fans, including several prominent 
jurists,135 have sung its praises despite the potential for splits and 
differences among the circuits.  Among other things, a robust 
percolation process allows the Court to use its limited monitoring 
resources more efficiently,136 minimizes the Court’s expenditures of 
political capital,137 incentivizes lower court judges to take their job 
more seriously,138 and lets the Court measure support for a potential 
                                                          
 134. See Wald, supra note 5, at 793 (lamenting the lack of empirical research on 
percolation); Todd J. Tiberi, Comment, Supreme Court Denials of Certiorari in Conflicts 
Cases:  Percolation or Procrastination?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 861, 862–63 (1993) 
(discussing the divergent views on the value of percolation). 
 135. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 24 n.1 (1995) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“We 
have in many instances recognized that when frontier legal problems are presented, 
periods of ‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate 
courts may yield a better informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this 
Court.”); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 400–01 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s reliance on lower courts); Richard A. Posner, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS:  CRISIS AND REFORM 163–64 (1991) (arguing that competition 
among different courts promotes legal development).  See generally Wald, supra note 
5, at 791–92 (recognizing Judge Posner’s and Justice Stevens’s endorsement of 
percolation). 
 136. It does so by helping the Court “identify important issues,” clarifying exactly 
where potential doctrinal tensions exist and focusing its limited caseload on areas 
where its intervention is most needed.  Estricher & Sexton, supra note 123, at 719–20.  
In this way, lower court decisions initiate a form of “Legal Darwinism” where the 
lower courts “weed out” weak arguments, leaving the Court to consider only the 
strong arguments that remain.  See Tiberi, supra note 134, at 865 (discussing how 
“various perspectives allow the Court to formulate judgments that are ‘clearer and 
better reasoned’” (citation omitted)).  The percolation process also enables the 
Court to conserve its monitoring resources when its involvement is rendered 
unnecessary through an independent lower court consensus or harmonization on a 
contested issue. 
 137. Percolation enables the Court to take a “temperature check” about how 
political actors and the public are reacting to the development of different 
constitutional rules, better calibrate the amount of institutional risk at stake in the 
decision to grant certiorari or in the potential resolutions of a particular dispute, and 
to weigh in once a legal or political consensus has been reached to avoid the 
unnecessary expenditure of political capital.  These data points are particularly 
critical in light of research suggesting that the Court responds strategically to the 
preferences of other coordinate branches when deciding certain constitutional civil 
rights cases.  Andrew D. Martin, Statutory Battles and Constitutional Wars:  Congress and 
the Supreme Court, in INSTITUTIONAL GAMES AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 10–11 (James 
R. Rogers et al. eds., 2006). 
 138. See Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 123, at 719 (asserting that, because they 
will often have the last word on the resolution of a particular legal issue, percolation 
“encourages the lower courts to act as responsible agents” in developing legal 
doctrine).  Furthermore, assuming lower court judges are incentivized by the 
potential for heightened prestige and national recognition, percolation improves the 
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ruling among lower court judges, who are ultimately charged with 
applying the rule and whose allegiance is necessary for the Court to 
enforce its will.139   
Percolation may also result in “better” law by removing the 
Supreme Court from the equation entirely.  There are risks every 
time the Court decides to intervene in a dispute, including the risk 
that the Court will magnify and nationalize a localized judicial 
mistake.140  Indeed, intervention by the high court, even when lower 
federal courts are divided, can create more problems than it solves 
due to the potential for division, inconsistency, and compromise in a 
decision issued by a closely divided, multi-member Court.141  
Like the precedent model, percolation claims legitimacy by serving 
a range of constitutional values, including experimentalism, intra- 
and inter- branch deliberation, pluralism, and judicial restraint.142 
1. Experimentalism   
The notion that optimal outcomes are best developed through a 
process of small-scale experiments that can then be nationalized is a 
core value underlying federalism and other aspects of our 
constitutional structure.143  Percolation advocates have replicated 
these arguments in the lower federal court context.144  Judge Posner, 
                                                          
quality of appellate judging by creating competition among judges in different 
circuits to develop optimal rules. See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking 
Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1629–37 (2007) 
(“Competition serves as an important check on poor decisions.”). 
 139. Friedman, supra note 5, at 304; Wald, supra note 5, at 778. 
 140. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, If It Aint Broke . . . , 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 67, 68 
(2010), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/supreme-
court/if-it-ain%27t-broke-.-.-./.  
 141. Wallace, supra note 125, at 921; see Paul M. Bator, What is Wrong with the 
Supreme Court?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 688–89 (1990) (responding to the argument 
that “Supreme Court review often adds to the uncertainties and anomalies of the law 
rather than alleviates them”).   
 142. See Ori Aronson, Inferiorizing Judicial Review:  Popular Constitutionalism in Trial 
Courts, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 971, 982–84 (2010) (positing that the values of 
participation, deliberation, and pluralism contribute to the legitimacy of a 
democracy by accommodating different groups in the political arena). 
 143. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 419 (1998) (arguing that democratic 
experimentalism “has been nascent in constitutional doctrine for quite some time”). 
 144. In adopting a similar position in light of the litigation explosion in the 
federal courts and pressing concerns about the Court’s caseload during the 1980s, 
Professors Sam Estreicher and John Sexton called for the Court to adopt a 
“managerial presumption” in favor of allowing many issues to percolate in the lower 
courts, even in the presence of a circuit split or clear error by a lower court.  They 
“embrace[] lower court percolation as an affirmative value,” espousing its potential 
to create “an experimental base and a set of doctrinal materials with which to fashion 
sound binding law” while allowing the Supreme Court to benefit from the 
experience of lower courts.  Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 123, at 719–20. 
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for example, argues that “conflicts that do not involve subjecting the 
same person to inconsistent legal obligations”145 should be subject to 
a percolation presumption, in which the issue is allowed to “simmer” 
until “most circuits have spoken.”146  His position is based on the 
assumption that “a difficult question is more likely to be answered 
correctly if it is allowed to engage the attention of different sets of 
judges deciding factually different cases than if it is answered finally 
by the first panel to consider it.”147  The percolation process harnesses 
the benefits of “diversity and competition” among lower courts, he 
argues, and is all the more critical now that federal circuits often play 
the role traditionally performed by states as competitive laboratories 
for the development of legal doctrine.148 
Among constitutional scholars, Michael Dorf has been the most 
outspoken proponent of a decentralized approach to constitutional 
adjudication.  From his perceptive, centralized hierarchies (like the 
federal court system under the precedent model) are ill-equipped to 
deal with the challenges presented by an increasingly complex and 
interdependent society, a realization that the private sector has 
already made by adopting decentralized organizational structures 
that disperse power throughout the organization.149  Dorf favors a 
more experimentalist approach to constitutional adjudication where 
the Court “enlist[s] . . . actors closer to the ground,”150 including 
lower federal courts, to facilitate “learning from experience” about 
the “consequences of different legal regimes.”151 
New York Times v. Sullivan152 is but one example of the Court 
internalizing the benefits of extended percolation. In Sullivan, the 
Court overturned an Alabama libel conviction on First Amendment 
grounds,153 rejecting Alabama’s broad liability approach and adopting 
a more speech-friendly “actual malice” standard that had evolved 
under state tort law in other jurisdictions.154  In short, the Court had 
at its disposal multiple approaches to solving a difficult legal 
problem, and was able to choose among them when constructing a 
                                                          
 145. Posner, supra note 135, at 163. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. (discussing the increase in federal appellate caseloads).  
 149. Michael C. Dorf, Foreword:  The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
4, 58 (1998). 
 150. Id. at 60.  
 151. Id. at 65. 
 152. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 153. Id. at 264.   
 154. Id. at 279–80. 
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constitutional standard rather than starting from scratch.155 
2. Intra- and inter-branch deliberation   
Percolation is a fundamentally deliberative process, one that 
reinforces the notion that dialogue within and across institutions is 
the best way to resolve difficult questions about competing values.156  
This deliberative ideal is embodied most clearly in the Constitution’s 
structural commitment to bicameralism, separation of powers, and an 
amendment process that involves dialogue among multiple 
institutions.157  On an intra-branch level, percolation advances these 
values about how constitutional conversations should take place by 
creating opportunities for deliberation within and between circuits.  
As Justice Stevens noted: 
[t]o identify rules that will endure, we must rely on the state and 
lower federal courts to debate and evaluate the different 
approaches to difficult and unresolved questions of constitutional 
law.  Deliberation on the question over time winnows out the 
unnecessary and discordant elements of doctrine and preserves 
“whatever is pure and sound and fine.”158 
Percolation also advances inter-branch deliberation in ways that 
promote core democratic values.  Constitutional disputes that linger 
at the lower court level provide time for political stakeholders to 
mobilize support for their positions, gather and analyze information, 
exert pressure on elected branches of government to adopt different 
policy choices, and to fully consider the impact of different 
constitutional rules on particular constituencies.  In turn, this sort of 
political mobilization can cause governmental actors to change 
course to avoid either a negative outcome or nationalization of a 
particular rule, eventually making it unnecessary for the Court to 
intervene.159 
                                                          
 155. See VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 
26 & 295 n.40 (2010) (citing New York Times v. Sullivan as an example of the Court 
choosing among available domestic precedents). 
 156. See Wald, supra note 5, at 776 (“[D]istinguished legal commentators caution 
against absolute pronouncements by the Supreme Court on complex constitutional 
issues, favoring instead the technique of allowing other branches of government, the 
states, and the lower courts, maximum flexibility about the timing and nature of 
remedies . . . .”). 
 157. See Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 1946–47 (interpreting the judiciary’s 
political appointment power endowed by Article III,  the amendment procedures 
prescribed by Article V, and the legislative enforcement powers enumerated in 
Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment as constitutional mechanisms that 
challenge the notion that constitutionalism is solely a judicial function). 
 158. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 400–01 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 159. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text (noting that Congress followed 
the lead of several circuit courts in repealing the military’s “don’t ask don’t tell” 
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In this light, percolation is a critical component of dialogic models 
of judicial review that see constitutional norms arising out of a 
conversation between the federal courts and political institutions.160  
If the Court is responsive to public opinion in its rulings,161 
percolation can help facilitate and shape the development of public 
attitudes, and, hence constitutional law, during a prolonged period 
of public contemplation and deliberation. 
3. Pluralism 
Constitutional law provides a structure for groups within a diverse 
society to negotiate their collective vision of the common good.162  By 
providing multiple fora for resolving constitutional disputes and the 
potential influence of localism, percolation helps a pluralistic society 
survive despite critical internal differences of opinion.  Louis Michael 
Seidman argues that unsettled areas of constitutional law allow a 
constitutional community to function by providing “losers” in the 
political process with another forum to argue the merits of their 
position.163  In turn, the availability of multiple constitutional fora at 
the lower court level gives groups whose constitutional agendas have 
floundered at the legislative or Supreme Court arenas multiple “bites 
at the apple,” enabling members of the polity who would otherwise 
remove themselves from the community or turn to less acceptable 
forms of dispute resolution to continue pursuing their goals through 
established constitutional structures.164 
                                                          
policy, rendering the Supreme Court’s involvement moot). 
 160. See Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 1945–47 (contending that the legitimacy 
and relevancy of the American system of constitutional law is grounded in the 
confluence of its multiple interpreters); Wald, supra note 5, at 776 (“[A]ll branches 
have responsibilities for constitutional interpretation and the Supreme Court should 
refrain whenever possible from imposing a single constitutional solution from on 
high . . . .”). 
 161. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 16 (asserting that, in the modern era, the 
Supreme Court’s judicial review function is “to serve as a catalyst, to force public 
debate, and ultimately to ratify the American people’s considered views about the 
meaning of their Constitution”). 
 162. See Pettys, supra note 116, at 164 (suggesting that the exchange between 
“judges, litigants, elected officials, and ordinary citizens” dictates the way in which 
the Constitution is interpreted). 
 163. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION:  A NEW DEFENSE OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2001); see  John M. Golden, The Supreme 
Court as “Prime Percolator”:  A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 662 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court can spur legal 
development, rather than foreclose it, by using its review power to unsettle ossified 
legal doctrines). 
 164. See SEIDMAN, supra note 163, at 9 (theorizing that constitutional 
indeterminacy provides individuals with the opportunity for continued political 
debate, enticing them to remain in the conversation).  
GEWIRTZMAN.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012 7:42 PM 
2012] LOWER COURT CONSTITUTIONALISM 489 
4. Judicial restraint   
Finally, lower courts have the power to constrain the reach of 
Supreme Court decisions, potentially blunting the power of certain 
high court rulings.165  In this way, percolation facilitates judicial 
restraint by allowing lower federal courts to act as a check on the 
Court’s exercise of judicial review.166  Indeed, in light of the limited 
ability of Congress or the Executive branch to check the Court’s 
power over constitutional interpretation, lower federal courts may be 
in a much better institutional position to check the Court’s misuse of 
judicial review than the political branches.167 
C. Percolation Critiques 
Percolation has long had vocal skeptics within the federal judiciary 
and academia.  The process has been referred to as “not a purposeful 
project,”168 an exercise in “elitist arrogance,”169 a “euphemism for 
incoherence,”170 “the great justifier of conflict,”171 and “an appealing 
rationalization for sharp departure from the rule of law.”172 
Some commentators have focused on the costs and lack of fairness 
to individual litigants, pointing out tensions between percolation and 
the constitutional values of due process and equal treatment.173  The 
episodic application of different legal standards pending final 
Supreme Court review causes federal circuit courts to treat similarly 
situated litigants differently.  As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, “[i]t is 
of little solace to the litigant who lost years ago in a court of appeals 
decision to learn that his case was part of the ‘percolation’ process 
which ultimately allowed the Supreme Court to vindicate his 
                                                          
 165. See Bhagwat, supra note 50, at 1013 (suggesting that, although circuit courts 
cannot exercise “full-scale civil disobedience” when applying Supreme Court 
decisions, these lower courts may “deviate from [Supreme Court] doctrine” or 
“impose doctrinal coherence”).    
 166. See id. (proposing that, if lower federal court judges more strongly asserted 
their independence, they could force the Supreme Court to rule with sounder legal 
reasoning and a greater consideration of a rule’s practical effects).  
 167. See id. at 1010–13 (asserting that circuit courts may be better equipped to 
curtail the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review because, unlike the President 
and Congress, lower federal court judges “are insulated from popular reaction”). 
 168. Bator, supra note 141, at 690. 
 169. Id. at 691. 
 170. Meador, supra note 130, at 634. 
 171. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 172. Friedman, supra note 5, at 306. 
 173. See Frost, supra note 130, at 1570 (describing one justification for a “uniform 
interpretation of federal law” as creating unfairness “if similarly situated litigants 
were treated differently due to variations in the reading of federal law” and, without 
uniformity, “predictability would suffer, raising the costs of doing business and 
fostering litigation”). 
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position.”174  The result is an “institutional myopia that focuses on 
abstractions and ignores the impact of the law on real people.”175  
This constitutes a policy departure from Article III’s focus on 
individual disputes through the “case and controversy” 
requirement,176 and involves the Court in an “experiment with the 
legal rights of citizens” that lacks constitutional authority.177   
Others have focused on the systemic costs, arguing that percolation 
perpetuates “uncertainty and repetitive litigation” by creating a lack 
of uniformity in federal law and thus undermining the legitimacy of 
the federal courts and potentially the Constitution itself.178  
Disuniformity exacts costs by allowing interpretive arguments that will 
eventually be rejected by the Supreme Court to remain good law.  
This “fragmentation,”179 in turn, encourages “unmeritorious” 
claims,180 causes potentially valid claims to be rejected,181 and creates 
more litigation to exploit the lack of certainty in the applicable legal 
rule.182  The lack of predictability that comes with legal uncertainty 
also makes it difficult for individuals or state actors to determine 
whether a particular constitutional rule applies to them, causing 
them to potentially forgo taking actions that are perfectly legal.183  
This also places a heavy burden on multi-state actors, who must 
conform their behavior to divergent and often conflicting rules.184 
                                                          
 174. William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1, 11 (1986). 
 175. Walter V. Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A. J. 452, 454 (1983); see 
Bator, supra note 141, at 690 (suggesting that percolation constitutes “arrogance and 
insensitivity” by legal elites). 
 176. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  
 177. Schaefer, supra note 175, at 454. 
 178. Frost, supra note 130, at 1582.  But see id. at 1579–1605 (providing a summary 
and refutation of the arguments in favor of uniformity in a non-constitutional 
context).  
 179. Schaefer, supra note 175, at 455. 
 180. Bator, supra note 141, at 690. 
 181. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year:  Some Implications of the 
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
1093, 1108 (1987) (highlighting the difficulty litigants face when the Supreme 
Court’s refusal to rule on an issue forces the litigants to continually reassert “losing” 
arguments to federal appellate courts that “may have little patience” for hearing the 
same failing arguments); see also Bator, supra note 141, at 679 (criticizing the current 
state of the American judicial system because the Supreme Court does not possess 
the capacity to address the large number of gaps and uncertainties that inundate 
constitutional doctrine).  Bator suggests that litigants either “don’t bother to petition 
for certiorari” or “become one of the 4,000 annual ‘certs’ denied.”  Bator, supra note 
141, at 680. 
 182. See Bator, supra note 141, at 690 (“[T]he uncertainty it engenders is itself a 
notorious breeder of litigation.”). 
 183. Id. at 689–90. 
 184. Strauss, supra note 181, at 1107; Wallace, supra note 125, at 931 (conceding 
that the absence of a definitive rule applied consistently among the circuits may 
cause uncertainties that would impose unacceptable impacts on “multicircuit actors,” 
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Another group of critics has argued that the Court, either by 
design or through behavior, is simply not equipped to internalize 
whatever benefits percolation offers.  Second Circuit Judge Henry 
Friendly expressed skepticism about whether courts of appeals “have 
much to contribute” to important constitutional disputes, and 
doubted “whether many of the Justices even read our opinions, at 
least on constitutional issues.”185  Scholars have argued that there is 
little evidence that the Court pays much attention to the legal 
solutions offered by lower courts,186 that the Court lacks the 
“institutional capacity” to make assessments about the practical 
implications of different rules adopted by lower courts,187 or that the 
Court engages in any systematic monitoring or comparison of lower 
court behavior within a given area of doctrine.188  
Percolation also brings concerns about inefficient allocation of 
resources.  Subsequent lower court cases often replicate the materials 
and arguments used in earlier cases, and thus have little to offer the 
Court.189  Further, in an environment where the Court is presented 
with an abundance of information from sophisticated litigants, amici 
curiae, and scholarly analysis, it is unlikely that decisions by lower 
federal courts will produce new arguments or analyses that alter the 
Court’s behavior.190  Additionally, it is difficult to determine when the 
                                                          
such as corporations). 
 185. Henry J. Friendly, Note, Foreword to the Second Circuit 1970 Term, 46 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 405, 407 (1972).  But see Pamela C. Corley et al., Lower Court Influence on U.S. 
Supreme Court Opinion Content, 73 J. Pol. 31 (2011) (using plagiarism software to find 
“evidence that the Court systematically incorporates language from the lower federal 
courts into its majority opinions”); Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The 
Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking:  A Study of 
Conflict Cases, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 135, 157 (2006) (empirical study of circuit splits 
with “findings suggest[ing] that the justices may consider information associated with 
decisionmaking processes in lower courts in formulating their perspectives about an 
appeal”); Tracey E. George & Jeffrey A. Berger, Judicial Entrepreneurs on the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals:  A Citation Analysis of Judicial Influence, 11 (2005),  available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=789544 (finding that, within 
data set of 654 Supreme Court cases, more than 60% of Supreme Court opinions 
“cite at least one circuit case other than the case under consideration”). 
 186. Caminker, supra note 24, at 58.  
 187. Bhagwat, supra note 50, at 980. 
 188. See Caminker, supra note 24, at 59 (“It is already a stretch to assume today 
that Justices or their clerks carefully read lower court opinions.”); Schaefer, supra 
note 175, at 454. 
 189. See Bator, supra note 141, at 690 (expressing skepticism that the opinions 
generated by lower federal courts provide novel insight for the Supreme Court); 
Caminker, supra note 24, at 60 (“Only infrequently will inferior courts develop 
unique analytical approaches or doctrinal constructs that would otherwise escape the 
Supreme Court’s attention.”). 
 190. Caminker, supra note 24, at 56; see Schaefer, supra note 175, at 454 
(suggesting that if Supreme Court justices desired external input, they could more 
easily consult legal academics and practitioners than “busy circuit court judges”). 
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process has reached the point that the costs imposed on litigants and 
society exceed the benefits that might be realized by continued 
percolation.191 
Finally, there are some substantive doubts about whether 
percolation actually produces a “better or more lasting judicial 
product.”192  Given the often abstract nature of constitutional 
decisions, it may be particularly challenging in constitutional cases to 
determine what constitutes a “better” judicial product,193 and the data 
collected by lower court rulings may be irrelevant to judges that 
adopt interpretive modalities—like originalism—that purport to 
ignore the real-world impact of constitutional rules.194  Nor is there 
any evidence that real-world data would prove more compelling than 
other information available to the Court, including the ideological 
predispositions of the Justices themselves.195 
D. Responses to the Critiques 
While the argument that percolation critics “overvalue uniformity” 
has been made elsewhere,196 these arguments can be expanded to 
further counter percolation critiques.  First and foremost is the 
inevitability of constitutional percolation.  It is not only tied to a core 
circuit court function—policymaking197—but it is all but assured given 
the dramatic increase in circuit court caseloads,198 the Supreme 
Court’s limited review capacity,199 and the doctrinal forces that are 
helping to expand courts’ discretionary space.200  This reality is not 
                                                          
 191. Bator, supra note 141, at 691. 
 192. Schaefer, supra note 175, at 454. 
 193. Bator, supra note 141, at 691. 
 194. Caminker, supra note 24, at 58–59. 
 195. Id. at 59. 
 196. See generally Frost, supra note 130, at 1567 (providing an overview of the 
arguments commonly advanced in favor of “uniform interpretation of federal law”).  
Frost’s article sheds doubt on the necessity of identically and uniformly interpreting 
federal law.  Id. at 1569–70, 1573. 
 197. See supra notes 122–133 and accompanying text (asserting that lower courts’ 
discretional authority enables them to serve as policy makers). 
 198. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Looking Ahead:  October Term 2007, in CATO SUP. 
CT. REV. 335, 351 (Mark K. Moller et al. eds., 2007) (characterizing the caseload of 
the federal courts of appeal as having “skyrocketed”).  
 199. See id. at 350–51 (reporting that, during the Supreme Court’s October 2006 
Term, the Court produced only 68 decisions after argument, while in 2006 the 
federal courts of appeal “produced 34,580 decisions on the merits”).  Reynolds 
suggests that the disparity between the number of cases heard by the Supreme Court 
and the number of cases heard by the lower federal courts precludes the possibility 
that the Court can adequately supervise the federal inferior courts.  Id. at 351.   
 200. See Pettys, supra note 116, at 124 (contending that constitutional law often 
possesses a degree of ambiguity that requires courts to make judgments about how to 
apply the “interpretative conventions of the legal profession [that] could resolve a 
given dispute”); supra notes 76–97 and accompanying text. 
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likely to change anytime soon, as the Court has shown no indication 
that it intends to increase the number of cases it hears every year201 or 
that it intends to provide firmer constitutional guidance to lower 
courts in its opinions.202  Moreover, within contested areas of 
constitutional law, the Court’s efforts to provide a definitive 
interpretive resolution rarely represent the last word on 
constitutional meaning, but are simply one more move in a continual 
intra- and inter-branch dialogue.203  Action by the Supreme Court 
rarely ends the percolation process, but simply initiates a period of 
“re-percolation” in which the new precedent is redefined by circuit 
courts.204  This dialogic process is built into the system’s design.  
Unlike many other constitutional systems, which assign responsibility 
for constitutional interpretation to a single constitutional court, our 
system empowers a legion of federal and state judges to continually 
weigh in on constitutional meaning.205  In this context, the crucial 
question is not whether percolation is good or bad, but how to design 
and structure a system that is best able to advance the constitutional 
values that percolation serves and to help the system internalize 
percolation’s benefits while minimizing potential costs.206   
Second, many of the critiques wrongly assume that percolation’s 
value is determined solely by the extent to which the Supreme Court 
uses the circuit courts’ reasoning and analysis.207  To the contrary, 
percolation has value regardless of whether it improves Supreme 
Court decision making.  In particular, it helps the interpretive system 
realize a larger set of goals about how to resolve difficult questions 
                                                          
 201. See Reynolds, supra note 198, at 350 (remarking that, since its genesis, the 
Roberts Court has consistently maintained a reduced caseload).   
 202. See Schauer, supra note 37, at 207 (discussing the Supreme Court’s recent 
trend of issuing decisions with either no simple majority opinion or no “clear, 
general, and subsequently usable statement of the Court’s reasoning or the Court’s 
view of the implications of its decision”).   
 203. See Wald, supra note 5, at 776, 778 (discussing how the Supreme Court’s 
unwillingness in Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), to establish a 
specific means for implementing desegregation in schools serves as a “cardinal 
example of the Supreme Court ‘engag[ing] other courts in a continuing dialogue on 
what the law . . . should be’”); see also Reynolds, supra note 198, at 351–52 (using the 
Supreme Court’s recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence to illustrate the notion that 
Supreme Court precedent does not necessarily “trickle down to affect decisions in 
the circuits”).   
 204. See Wald, supra note 5, at 778 (explaining that, when the Court issues a 
ruling, “it often redelegates to the lower courts the job of ultimately deciding 
whether there has been a constitutional violation or not”).   
 205. See Aronson, supra note 142, at 986. 
 206. Cf. Wallace, supra note 125, at 929 (implying that circuit court conflicts may 
be necessary evils, as they “embody a subtle mixture of both good and bad aspects”). 
 207. See supra notes 185–188 and accompanying text (arguing that it is unlikely 
that the Supreme Court monitors and applies the arguments and rationales 
advanced in lower court decisions).   
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that involve competing constitutional values, including the creation 
of opportunities for experimentation and dialogue within and among 
institutions.208  When circuit courts are seen entirely through the lens 
of the precedent model and principal-agent values,209 inadequate 
recognition is given to the set of competing constitutional values 
embodied by percolation, or how to best design a system that serves 
those values.210 
Third, the arguments on either side of the percolation debate lack 
empirical data, making it difficult to tell whether the skepticism 
about percolation’s value is grounded in reality.211  With some very 
limited and isolated exceptions,212 we know surprisingly little about 
how often circuits disagree about constitutional interpretation, the 
extent to which circuits pay attention to what other circuits are doing, 
their ability to influence one another, or the extent to which circuit 
court opinions actually influence the content of Supreme Court 
opinions.213  There are very few studies exploring the length of time 
that cases percolate or the impact of a lengthier percolation period 
that allows a larger number of circuits to weigh in on a particular 
issue.214 
Finally, most percolation critics do not adequately address the very 
real problem of discretionary space.  Even if one acknowledges that 
percolation imposes costs by sacrificing uniformity and efficiency, this 
does not tell circuit court judges anything about the right way to 
make interpretive choices when confronted with them or how to 
                                                          
 208. See Wallace, supra note 125, at 929 (referring to circuit courts as 
“laboratories” for novel legal doctrine).  
 209. See supra Part I.A (explaining that, under the precedent model, circuit courts 
act as attendants to the Supreme Court’s demand).    
 210. Cf. Bator, supra note 141, at 689 (“[I]t would be extremely undesirable to 
have every issue of law finally and definitively settled, authoritatively and for all, in 
the very first case in which it arises.”).   
 211. Tiberi, supra note 134, at 863. 
 212. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 110, at 2158 (offering an empirical explanation 
of the circumstances under which appellate courts adhere to Supreme Court 
precedent); Lindquist & Cross, supra note 59, at 1158 (offering an empirical analysis 
of the effect of judicial ideology on the lower federal court judges’ reliance on 
precedent); Rorie Spill Solberg et al., Inter-Court Dynamics and the Development of Legal 
Policy:  Citation Patterns in the Decision of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 34 POL’Y STUD. J. 277, 
277 (2006) (assessing the number of occasions where circuit courts drew on other 
circuits’ policies in issuing decisions related to the Americans with Disabilities Act); 
Tiberi, supra note 134, at 863 (providing “an empirical estimate” of the advantages 
and disadvantages of percolation); infra notes 375–383 and accompanying text 
(discussing David Klein’s empirical study of the role of lower federal courts in the 
institution of new legal doctrine). 
 213. See Schaefer, supra note 175, at 454 (finding a void of empirical evidence 
relating to percolation’s impact on Supreme Court review).    
 214. See Bator, supra note 141, at 691 (explaining that percolation’s randomness 
makes it difficult to study).    
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exercise that authority in ways that serve larger constitutional 
values.215 
E. Existing Models for Discretionary Space  
The precedent model’s difficult relationship with discretionary 
space and the circuit courts’ policymaking function presents a set of 
intriguing questions that have drawn surprisingly little scholarly 
attention:  what should circuit judges do when confronted with 
discretionary space in constitutional law?  How should they exercise 
their interpretive discretion in ways that best serve their competing 
institutional functions?  
The existing normative models for circuit court discretion have 
primarily moved in one of two directions.  First, under what Evan 
Caminker calls the “proxy model,” lower court judges “function as 
geographically dispersed extensions of the Supreme Court . . . [and] 
are merely intended to facilitate universal access to the Court’s 
edicts.”216  When confronted with discretionary space, the proxy 
model asks lower court judges to put themselves in the Supreme 
Court’s shoes and decide cases as they believe the Court would 
decide them.217  They fulfill this function by “‘counting heads’ on the 
Supreme Court in order to predict . . . [its] future rulings,”218 
reinforcing the hierarchical relationship between principal and 
agent.219  In turn, lower federal courts provide little value beyond 
their ability to divine and enforce the Supreme Court’s will. 
A second approach, the “substantive values” model, argues that 
lower federal courts should follow whatever the constitutional 
theorist’s preferred interpretive theory happens to be.220  It could be a 
form of originalism,221 Cass Sunstein’s theory of judicial 
minimalism,222  Ronald Dworkin’s appeal to “law as integrity,”223 a 
                                                          
 215. See Pettys, supra note 116, at 124 (“[J]udges faced with constitutional 
controversies often must choose from an array of conflicting—yet conventionally 
permissible—interpretive options.”).  
 216. Caminker, supra note 24, at 16.  
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 65. 
 219. See Dorf, supra note 31, at 672–73 (observing that lower courts, bound by 
hierarchal stare decisis, are forced to predict how the Supreme Court would 
adjudicate when ruling on questions of law that the Court has not clearly answered). 
 220. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. 
REV. 535, 562 (1999) (determining that the goal of substantive theories is to 
“promote transparent substantive goals”).  
 221. See id. at 563 (explaining how originalism is more formal than substantive).  
 222. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword:  Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1996) (advocating “judicial minimalism” in constitutional interpretation).. 
 223. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW:  THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 2 (1996) (advocating a method of interpreting the Constitution based 
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particular type of common law reasoning, a version of pragmatism, or 
any number of other interpretive theories that fall in and out of 
vogue.224  From this perspective, lower court judges are no different 
than the Supreme Court:  if the theory is good enough for the 
Supreme Court to adopt, then all judges charged with interpreting 
the Constitution should adopt it as well.225  In turn, lower courts 
provide little value beyond their ability to enshrine the theorist’s 
preferred interpretive perspective into law.226   
Both schools of thought would have a homogenizing effect on 
lower court constitutionalism.  The proxy model would create 
uniformity by orienting judges around a single question:  What 
Would SCOTUS Do?227  The substantive values model would have a 
similar effect by getting all judges to subscribe to whatever the 
theorist’s constitutional vision happens to be.228  Neither places much 
stock in the set of constitutional values underlying percolation, tries 
to exploit the experimental benefits of interpretation within a 
partially decentralized system, or deals with the reality of bottom-up 
constitutionalism.  Instead, they seek to impose interpretive 
uniformity within the federal judiciary as either an end in itself229 or 
as a consequence of arriving at the “correct” constitutional answer.230 
The practical obstacles to both theories have been critiqued 
elsewhere.  Under the proxy model, it remains extraordinarily 
difficult for lower court judges to predict what a closely divided multi-
                                                          
on moral principles).  
 224. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 5 (1985) (presenting a substantive theory of constitutional 
interpretation based on natural law).  
 225. See Fallon, supra note 220, at 577 (explaining that, if the Supreme Court were 
to require that a particular interpretive theory be employed when deciding 
constitutional issues, its decision, although final, could be protested and critiqued by 
dissenting justices and critics).  But see Sunstein, supra note 222, at 14 (1996) (noting 
that the Court has not yet endorsed a specific interpretive theory).   
 226. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 
(1998) (expressing concern about the difficulty of formulating substantive principles 
that apply to the “vast range of difficult issues . . . in constitutional law”). 
 227. See Kim, supra note 28, at 437 (explaining how the proxy model ensures that 
courts interpret federal law similarly). 
 228. See Fallon, supra note 220, at 577 (mentioning that, if the Supreme Court 
were to formally endorse a specific theory of constitutional interpretation, lower 
courts would be bound by this ruling). 
 229. See Frost, supra note 130, at 1584 (assessing the rationales for uniformity, 
including the need for efficiency and “structural harmony” and the desire for all 
citizens to be treated equally).  But see DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1, 35 (2002) (illustrating how inconsistency can result when 
lower courts try to anticipate the actions of higher courts).  
 230. See Kim, supra note 28, at 437 (analyzing the argument that the proxy model 
“enhances judicial proficiency by recognizing the relative competencies of different 
courts”).    
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member Court will do in a given case.231  It assumes that the Supreme 
Court is somehow better than court of appeals panels at arriving at 
the “correct” interpretation,232 relies too much on the principal-agent 
model,233 and prioritizes interpretive uniformity above all else.234  It is 
also not clear that circuit judges actually buy into the proxy model or 
find it useful.  Empirical studies attempting to examine the influence 
of the sitting Court’s preferences on circuit court decision making 
have been inconclusive,235 with one recent study concluding that the 
circuit’s en banc preferences may have a greater impact on how 
circuit judges decide cases than the preferences of the sitting Court.236 
Substantive values models suffer from the impossibility of ever 
finding a consensus about the “correct” constitutional answer or 
methodology.237  There is no definitive way of knowing whether or 
why one method of constitutional interpretation is better than any 
other, and it is unlikely that there will ever be a long-term consensus 
on the issue.  Constitutional disputes often involve intractable clashes 
where both sides can plausibly claim a strong basis in the 
constitutional text and values,238 the sorts of disputes that can often 
look more like political problems than legal ones.  Moreover, the 
substantive values model often focuses on interpretive methods, like 
originalism, that are rarely practiced at the lower court level, where 
the doctrinal analysis mandated by the precedent model dominates.  
                                                          
 231. See generally Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project:  
Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1171 (2004) (explaining the results of a project in which a 
statistical model more accurately predicted Supreme Court case outcomes than did a 
group of legal experts).  
 232. Kim, supra note 28, at 437 (“By mimicking the Supreme Court’s anticipated 
decision, the lower courts will incorporate the ‘better’ answer from the beginning, 
thus improv[ing] decisionmaking at all levels of the judiciary.”). 
 233. Id. at 434 (characterizing the principal-agent relationship as one in which the 
agent must “act only in the interests of the principal”).   
 234. See Frost, supra note 130, at 1584 (listing the arguments commonly advanced 
in favor of a uniform interpretation of federal law, including the need for 
“predictability” and the desire to protect “the ‘perceived legitimacy’ of the federal 
courts”). 
 235. See generally Haire, supra note 41, at 511 (describing the mixed results of 
studies designed to test the hypothesis that lower courts feel bound by the 
preferences of higher courts). 
 236. See Kim, supra note 73, at 1368 (finding that the full circuit preferences have 
a greater influence on panel effects than the Supreme Court’s preferences). 
 237. See supra notes 221–224 and accompanying text (listing various theories of 
constitutional interpretation).  
 238. See generally Robert M. Cover, Forward:  Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
4, 19 (1983) (declaring the “one great dilemma of the American constitutional 
order” to be the “multiplicity of the legal meanings created out of the exiled 
narratives and the divergent social bases for their use”).  
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As a result, its practical significance to lower court judges is often 
negligible. 
F. The Need for a New Approach  
Discretionary space and percolation are critical parts of modern 
constitutionalism.  The precedent model, with its focus on the 
principal-agent hierarchy and error correction, is ill-equipped to 
guide circuit courts through the interpretive spaces where they act as 
constitutional policy makers.239  Moreover, the existing frameworks 
for discretionary space—the proxy model and the substantive values 
model—suffer from operational difficulties that make their adoption 
by lower courts impractical.240   These problems suggest the need for a 
different normative approach to discretionary space and lower court 
constitutionalism, one that reflects the full institutional role of lower 
courts in a partially decentralized system and the full range of values 
advanced by that structure. 
A new approach requires a shift in both the unit of analysis and the 
underlying goal.  The proxy model takes as its unit of analysis the 
hierarchical relationship between the Supreme Court and lower 
courts, and seeks to maximize the uniformity and efficiency provided 
by that structure.241  The substantive values model focuses on the 
“correct” constitutional answer or interpretive methodology and 
advances whatever substantive value the theorist divines from the 
constitutional text.242 
But suppose the unit of analysis was the interpretive system itself:  
the interdependent network of relationships that allow multiple 
courts to create constitutional law through interactions that move in 
both directions within the judicial hierarchy.  With the system as the 
focus of analysis, the normative goal would shift as well, optimizing 
the system’s overall performance in ways that take full advantage of 
the discretionary space embedded in the system’s structure and 
behavior.   
How, then, would one define optimal performance for such a 
system?  Systems theorists often measure a system’s performance by 
looking at the systems’ resilience and adaptive capacity:  its ability to 
survive, adjust, and thrive in a changing environment.243  Instead of 
                                                          
 239. Supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.  
 240. See Ruger et al., supra  note 231, at 1151 (showing that Supreme Court 
outcomes are hard to predict, making the proxy values models impractical); supra 
notes 232–239 and accompanying text. 
 241. Supra notes 227, 229 and accompanying text. 
 242. Supra notes 228, 230 and accompanying text. 
 243. See J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in 
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the uniformity and efficiency offered by the hierarchy of the proxy 
model, or the “correct” constitutional answer or methodology offered 
by the substantive values model, suppose the goal was to build an 
interpretive system best equipped to ensure the long-term survival of 
constitutional structures and values in a dynamic environment that 
produces a constant supply of competing interpretive visions, like 
meteorites bombarding a planet.244   
With resilience and adaptive capacity at the forefront, the 
decentralized features of such a system would become assets rather 
than a source of agency costs.245  Like any robust ecosystem, 
cooperation and competition among its various independent 
components could help the system adapt and develop optimal 
solutions,246 while still providing stability and predictability.247  The 
result would not necessarily be “better” constitutional law, but rather 
a system that best ensures the survival and relevance of constitutional 
law in a rapidly changing world.248 
From this vantage point, both the proxy model and the substantive 
values model fall short, since both would constrain the interpretive 
system’s adaptive capacity.249  By moving all circuit courts toward a 
                                                          
Legal Systems—With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 
1374–75 (2011) (addressing the distinctions between resilience of legal systems and 
the laws they produce).  Ruhl defines resilience as “‘the capacity of a system to 
experience shocks while retaining essentially the same function, structure, feedbacks, 
and therefore identity.’”  Id. at 1375–76.  He distinguishes between two types of 
resilience—engineering resilience and ecological resilience—which differ in the 
extent to which they adjust systemic processes in response to disturbance.  Id. at 
1376–77. He defines “adaptive capacity” as the system’s ability to respond to “threats 
to system equilibrium . . . by changing resilience strategies without changing 
fundamental attributes of the system.”  Id. at 1388.  The structure and substance of 
constitutional law involves a mix of resilience strategies.  Engineering resilience 
dominates the Constitution’s approach to institutional design, while ecological 
resilience is present in the common law aspects of constitutional interpretation.  Id. 
at 1380–81. 
 244. See Cover, supra note 238, at 42 (explaining the existence of various 
“communit[ies] of interpretation,” each of which possesses its own collection of 
“narratives, experiences, and visions to which the norm articulated is the right 
response”).  
 245. See Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra note 25, at 1419 (using biology’s “complexity 
theory” to show how the “centralized federal regulatory state . . . is impeding the 
adaptiveness of the American sociolegal system”).  
 246. YANEER BAR-YAM, MAKING THINGS WORK:  SOLVING COMPLEX PROBLEMS IN A 
COMPLEX WORLD 76–77 (Chitra Ramalingam et al. eds., 2004). 
 247. See generally Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra note 25, at 1410 (explaining that the 
systems that most effectively “hold[] themselves together for the long run” are those 
that “maintain a balance between stasis and change”). 
 248. See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System:  How 
To Clean Up the Environment By Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 
933, 953 (1997) (characterizing the virtue of a complex adaptive system as its 
sustainability over a long period of time rather than its short term level of 
performance). 
 249. See generally supra notes 227–244 and accompanying text (outlining the 
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single homogenized interpretive approach, the system would lose 
much of its ability to actively contribute to conversations about 
constitutional values or adapt to change.250  Rather than serving as a 
sounding board for the airing of competing constitutional visions in a 
pluralistic society, circuit courts under both models only serve to 
ossify the interpretive system.251   
Why does the system’s adaptive capacity matter?  It matters because 
the future of constitutionalism as a preeminent source of social values 
is at stake.  Today, judge-made constitutional law is beset by 
competition from other sources of norms and law, each trying to 
become the dominant lens through which individuals define 
themselves and their rights in relation to the state and one another.252  
On one level, private ordering systems—the relationships created by 
contracts, property, employment, and the marketplace—offer their 
own set of norms and expectations that reflect the realities and power 
dynamics of the market rather than constitutional principles.  On 
another level, globalization brings the expansion of international law, 
multi-national corporations, and new governance bodies that 
threaten to subsume constitutionalism within a larger network of law 
that transcends national boundaries.   
Competition in the market for law, sped by technological 
development and globalization, requires an interpretive system that 
can adapt to fast-paced change;253 otherwise large swaths of 
constitutional law will evolve toward greater irrelevance and 
obsolescence as sources of meaning in a rapidly evolving world. A 
systems-based theory of lower court constitutionalism envisions a role 
for circuit courts in that struggle, one that enables a diverse 
pluralistic society to maintain its core constitutional value 
                                                          
weaknesses of both the proxy and substantive values models).   
 250. See generally supra notes 227–244 and accompanying text (noting that neither 
form of interpretation allows for adaptability or growth). 
 251. See generally Ralph Stacey, Strategy as Order Emerging from Chaos, 26 LONG RANGE 
PLANNING 10, 13 (1993) (noting that organizations are pulled toward ossification 
when “group goals [are] stressed above individual ones, power [is] concentrated, 
communication and procedures [are] formalized, and strongly shared cultures [are] 
established”). 
 252. See generally Cover, supra note 238, at 4 (arguing that the “rules and principles 
of justice, the formal institutions of the law, and the conventions of a social order” 
are “but a small part of the normative universe that ought to claim our attention”); 
David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming June 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1923556 (empirical study concluding that “the U.S. 
Constitution appears . . . to be losing its appeal as a model for constitutional drafters 
elsewhere”). 
 253. See Nicolaj Siggelkow & Jan W. Rivkin, Speed and Search:  Designing 
Organizations for Turbulence and Complexity, 16 ORG. SCI. 101, 101 (2005) (explaining 
how technological change has “intensified competition”). 
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commitments while positioning itself for change.254   
Moreover, federal courts are in competition with other entities to 
define constitutional meaning.255  Executive officials, legislators, and 
citizens alter constitutional norms in ways that are both large and 
small, threatening the judiciary’s role as a final arbiter of 
constitutional law.256  These other institutions enjoy some clear 
advantages in the competition for interpretive supremacy, including 
greater resources and the support of mobilized political 
constituencies.  A systemic perspective gives lower courts a role to 
play in helping the federal judiciary maintain its relevance and 
influence in an environment where judges are often outgunned and 
outmaneuvered by other interpretive bodies and the speed of 
external events.257 
III. COMPLEXITY THEORY AND DISCRETIONARY SPACE 
A systems-based approach to lower court constitutionalism requires 
a systems-based theory.  In recent years, organizational theorists and 
legal scholars have begun using complexity theory to examine how 
separate, autonomous components of a system interact and affect one 
another’s behavior, and how those interactions affect the system’s 
behavior.258  With its focus on decentralization and institutional 
design, complexity theory offers a potential structure for thinking 
about how lower courts and discretionary space operate within an 
interpretive system. 
Complexity theory grew out of an effort by natural and social 
scientists to understand how order and stability arise in systems where 
the individual components maintain some independence from one 
another and act in ways that are sometimes unpredictable.259  These 
                                                          
 254. See supra notes 246–248 and accompanying text (showing how a complex 
adaptive system can maintain stability and predictability).  
 255. See Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What it 
Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1047 (1977) (providing examples of 
situations in which Congress and the President have altered the way the Constitution 
is interpreted).  
 256. Id.  
 257. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653–55 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining that, because of the President’s prestige and 
influence, the legislative and judicial branches often fail to adequately check and 
balance his power).   
 258. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 60, at 1637 (analogizing the application of 
complexity theory to evolutionary fitness with the potential application of complexity 
theory to a discussion of “the fitness of the body politic”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 
Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110, 112 (1991) (criticizing legal scholars who 
expect to be able to predict the progression of legal principles and suggesting that 
chaos theory would provide a better model). 
 259. See STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE:  THE SEARCH FOR THE LAWS 
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theorists sought to explain, for example, how the “invisible hand” of 
the marketplace helps to guide independent economic actors toward 
the most efficient and effective collective solutions,260 how ecosystems 
composed of independent and diverse species manage to achieve 
stability while successfully evolving in response to dynamic 
environmental shifts,261 and how decentralized computer networks 
survive and thrive.262 
A. Complex Adaptive Systems 
At the heart of complexity theory are entities known as “complex 
adaptive systems.”263  These systems are composed of different 
“agents”—individual components of the system that operate with 
some degree of autonomy but are also interdependent.264  Agents can 
take many forms depending on the level at which the system is 
defined:  atoms, molecules, organs, individuals, industries, and 
nation-states are all agents within complex adaptive systems.265  The 
system’s “complexity” derives from the number of different agents, 
the diverse characteristics and behavior of those agents, and the ways 
they interact and affect one another’s actions.266  Moreover, these 
systems can be composed of subsystems that are complex adaptive 
systems in and of themselves, which adds to the level of complexity.267  
Even though agents within a complex adaptive system operate with 
some degree of independence, the system exhibits some form of 
overall self-organization and order.268  Rather than degenerating into 
                                                          
OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY 17–19 (1995) (explaining why “we cannot 
predict long-term behavior” for chaotic systems); Ruhl, Law’s Complexity, supra note 
25, at 890–93 (describing how “[c]omplexity arises when the dependencies among 
the elements become important”). 
 260. See Richard S. Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking:  Evolving and Applying Emergent 
Solutions for U.S. Communications Policy, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 483, 489 (2009) (equating 
Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” theory to “the concept of phenomena emerging from 
a complex adaptive system”). 
 261. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity, supra note 25, at 985–96. 
 262. EDGAR E. PETERS, COMPLEXITY, RISK AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 47–49 (1999). 
 263. See Ruhl, Law’s Complexity, supra note 25, at 887 (defining the theory of 
complex adaptive systems as “the study of systems comprised of a macroscopic, 
heterogeneous set of autonomous agents interacting and adapting in response to 
one another and to external environmental inputs”). 
 264. Id. 
 265. See Steve Maguire et al., Complexity Science and Organization Studies, in THE 
SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATION STUDIES 165, 204 (Stewart R. Clegg et al. eds., 2d 
ed. 2006). 
 266. See generally id. at 890–92 (noting that there is no universal standard for 
determining when an adaptive system has transformed into a complex adaptive 
system).  
 267. Cherry, supra note 25, at 380. 
 268. See Ruhl, Law’s Complexity, supra note 25, at 895 (describing a state of “stable 
disequilibrium” in complex adaptive systems).  
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chaos as agents make their own choices about how to act, the system 
achieves a level of overall stability and predictability.269  
Two concepts are helpful to understanding how complex adaptive 
systems maintain their stability and integrity while displaying 
enhanced adaptive capacity:  fitness landscapes and emergence. 
1. Fitness landscapes   
Agents in complex adaptive systems move through what complexity 
theorists call “fitness landscapes,” in which they travel along a 
trajectory of different fitness levels that measure how successful the 
agent is at achieving its goals at any given time.270  For example, 
imagine an ecosystem where each species moves upward when it 
thrives, and downward when it approaches extinction.271  At times, the 
species may get stuck at a suboptimal peak, capable of survival but 
unable to find a way to improve its fitness level.272   
As different species “walk” through their fitness landscapes in an 
effort to increase their fitness levels,273 they interact with one another 
by competing for scarce resources or cooperating for mutual gain.274  
These interdependencies cause changes in the evolution and 
behavior of each species, which in turn alter their respective fitness 
levels.275  Interactions among agents also provide the system with 
regular opportunities to disrupt its own status quo, forcing agents 
stuck at suboptimal peaks to adopt new strategies in response to 
changes by other agents within the system.  The result is a pathway 
that is rarely linear; instead, it contains peaks and valleys as each 
species adapts to changes in its environment and the relative fitness 
levels of other species within the ecosystem.276 
As these semi-autonomous agents try to improve their respective 
fitness levels and make choices that affect the actions of other agents, 
the system accumulates feedback about the effects of each choice.277  
Through these feedback mechanisms, the system exhibits a greater 
                                                          
 269. See Cherry, supra note 25, at 380 (discussing how “attractors,” the “behavioral 
results that flow from forces of order and disorder that might exist within a system to 
regulate surprise generators of chaos, emergency, and catastrophe” lend stability and 
predictability to complex systems). 
 270. Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra note 25, at 1416. 
 271. Id. at 1453.   
 272. Id.  
 273. See id. at 1453–54 (analogizing the adaptive walk to the way that several 
scholars have analogized the way that laws progressevolving social practices 
produce incremental changes). 
 274. Id. at 1463–64.   
 275. Id. at 1463. 
 276. Cherry, supra note 25, at 381; Ruhl, supra note 60, at 1450. 
 277. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity, supra note 25, at 895. 
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ability to survive and thrive over time as it successfully adapts to 
changes in its environment through the widespread adoption of 
different agent innovations.278   
2. Emergence   
The interdependent interactions among agents along a fitness 
landscape produce emergent behavior, a predominant feature in 
complex adaptive systems.  Emergence means that the system displays 
characteristics that may not be present in its individual 
components.279  As a result, one cannot fully understand the system’s 
behavior by studying individual traits and behavior280—“the whole is 
different from the sum of its parts.”281  The relationships and 
interactions between the system’s agents define the system rather 
than the characteristics of the agents themselves.282   
Emergence does not mean that the system is chaotic or defies 
description.  To the contrary, a complex adaptive system can establish 
emergent patterns of behavior that are powerful and help the system 
maintain long-term stability.283  Instead of chaos and randomness, 
these decentralized lower-level interactions often produce a form of 
higher-level overall order, though the order comes from the 
emergent patterns among agents rather than from a centralized 
decision-maker.  Markets maintain their ability to set efficient prices 
despite changes in market participants, ecosystems manage to survive 
despite the decline of a particular species,284 and judiciary systems 
maintain their commitment to the rule of law despite changes in 
their agent populations.   
These emergent patterns arise from sets of local rules that guide 
each agent’s behavior rather than from the direction of a supreme 
                                                          
 278. See ROBERT AXELROD & MICHAEL D. COHEN, HARNESSING COMPLEXITY:  
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER 28–29 (1999) (“The 
exploitation of new information technology to create desirable adaptation increases 
the linkages that foster systemic complexity.”); PETERS, supra note 262, at 50 
(discussing how feedback generates adaptation). 
 279. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity, supra note 25, at 894; see AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 
278, at 15 (defining and providing examples of “emergent properties”). 
 280. Daniel M. Katz & Derek K. Stafford, Hustle and Flow:  A Social Network Analysis 
of the American Federal Judiciary, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 457, 465 (2010). 
 281. Daniel M. Katz et al., Social Architecture, Judicial Peer Effects and the “Evolution” of 
the Law:  Toward a Positive Theory of Judicial Social Structure, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 977, 
985 (2008) (internal quotations omitted); see Maguire et al., supra note 265 
(explaining the origins of complexity science). 
 282. Katz & Stafford, supra note 280, at 465; see Ruhl, Law’s Complexity, supra note 
25, at 891 (“[T]he theoretical model has come to rest on a collection of agent and 
system properties that are at the core of complexity.”). 
 283. See id. at 50 (noting that, “[i]n complex systems, interactions reinforce one 
another and result in behavior that is very different from the norm”). 
 284. Id. at 9–10. 
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leader.285  The classic example is a group of birds flying in a V.  The V 
shape does not emerge from the birds following a single leader that 
directs them into formation, but from a set of interactions between 
individual birds based on rules that govern each bird’s behavior in 
relation to the small number of birds nearest to it.286  From this set of 
local rules, the decentralized system achieves some sort of higher-
level order even though the individual agents are not seeking to 
create it.287   
As Adrian Vermeule notes, our constitutional system is filled with 
emergent properties and behavior.288  He describes, for example, how 
a Supreme Court composed of highly biased justices might behave in 
an unbiased manner when it acts as a whole, or how biases within 
Congress or the executive branch might offset the polarized effects of 
decisions made by a highly biased Court.289  Outcomes in our 
constitutional system are not simply the products of individual actors 
asserting their will through a hierarchical system, but emerge from 
interactions between agents within an institution and between 
different institutions.290 
In recent years, scholars have developed a rich account of 
emergent behavior in federal circuit courts.  The voting behavior of 
circuit judges is affected by the other judges that sit on their panel (a 
well-documented phenomenon known as “panel effects”),291 strategic 
choices made by judges in response to the circuit’s en banc 
preferences,292 the presence of a dissenting opinion,293 consensus 
norms within the circuit (sometimes known as “dissent aversion”),294 
                                                          
 285. Gregory Todd Jones, Dynamical Jurisprudence:  Law as a Complex System, 24 GA. 
ST. L. REV. 873, 873 (2008). 
 286. R. KEITH SAWYER, SOCIAL EMERGENCE:  SOCIETIES AS COMPLEX SYSTEMS 3 (2005).  
 287. Id. 
 288. Adrian Vermeule, Foreword:  System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 36 (2009). 
 289. Id. at 39–43. 
 290. Id. at 69–70. 
 291. Kim, supra note 73, at 1322; see Revesz, supra note 110, at 1719 (explaining 
that a judge’s voting behavior is greatly influenced by the “party affiliation of the 
other judges on the panel” than by his or her own party affiliation). 
 292. See Kim, supra note 73, at 1326 (“[S]trategic theories suggest that panel 
effects will depend upon the preferences of the Supreme Court and/or the circuit as 
a whole, and not just upon the preferences of the three judges comprising an 
appellate panel.”). 
 293. VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT:  INFLUENCES 
ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 76–77 (2006). 
 294. See Lee Epstein et al., Why (and When) Judges Dissent:  A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 102 (2011) (demonstrating how the ability 
of extreme judges to influence more moderate judges’ voting behaviors “can be 
explained in terms of self-interested behavior that is independent of the influence of 
other judges”). 
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and Supreme Court preferences.295  To understand how circuit court 
judges exercise interpretive discretion, it is insufficient to look at 
each judge in isolation.  Instead, what matters is how these judges 
interact with one another, affect each other’s behavior, and the 
outcomes that emerge from those complex interactions. 
If one takes the interpretive role of lower courts seriously, all of 
judge-made constitutional law is emergent, the product of separate 
decisions made by, and interactions between, thousands of federal 
and state judges.  Like a pixilated picture, we cannot understand 
constitutional law’s content by examining the characteristics of a 
single agent or even a group of agents.296  We can only fully 
understand it by looking at the collective behaviors that emerge and 
the web of relationships that exist among different agents within the 
system. 
B. Complexity and the Interpretive System  
Once lower courts are seen as agents within a complex adaptive 
system of constitutional interpretation, complexity theory offers a 
potential framework for thinking about how they should exercise 
discretionary space.  It shifts the unit of analysis from the individual 
judge (the proxy model)297 or the theorist (the substantive values 
model)298 to the interpretive system and its design, and it moves the 
focus from error correction and the relationship between principal 
and agent to the policymaking function and the role that circuit 
court agents play in the creation and development of constitutional 
doctrine.  
Complexity theory opens the door to asking the precise questions 
that scholars studying lower court constitutionalism should be 
asking299:  How do lower courts help create and maintain the system’s 
emergent behavior?  What is the optimal balance between variety and 
uniformity among lower courts?  What is the best way to structure 
interactions among different judges and circuits?300  How can the 
                                                          
 295. Kim, supra note 73, at 1326–27; see Carrubba & Clark, supra note 97, at 21–22 
(comparing the “ideological divergence of the lower court” with “the likelihood of 
(i) review and (ii) reversal”). 
 296. JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS:  AN 
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 44–45 (2007). 
 297. Supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 298. Supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 299. See Kim, supra note 20, at 567 (“The widespread reliance on principal-agent 
theories to describe the judicial hierarchy has obscured these normative questions 
such that they have largely gone unasked.”). 
 300. AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 278, at 22–23; see Ruhl, Law’s Complexity, supra 
note 25, at 892 (explaining how variety governs the complexity of species’ 
interactions). 
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system harness the experimental benefits of decentralization to 
optimize its overall performance while maintaining order and 
consistency?  Instead of seeking the best method for interpreting the 
Constitution, the complexity theorist looks for the best way to design 
an interpretive system that can achieve the ideal balance between 
continuity and change.301 
IV. TOWARD A COMPLEXITY-BASED AGENDA FOR LOWER COURT 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
A complexity-based approach to lower court constitutionalism and 
discretionary space has many implications, too many to fit in a single 
article.  As an initial effort to explore how one might integrate 
complexity theory into the dialogue about lower court 
constitutionalism and discretionary space, this Part makes two central 
claims: 
First, discretionary space helps our interpretive system achieve 
optimal performance by allowing lower courts to move the system 
closer to the “sweet spot” between rigidity and randomness.  It does 
so by giving the system the flexibility to adjust where it falls on that 
continuum, using uncertainty to enhance the system’s resilience and 
adaptive capacity.  Rather than viewing discretionary space as a 
danger to the values embodied by the principal-agent hierarchy or as 
a chance to impose the theorist’s own values, complexity theory treats 
constitutional indeterminacy as essential to the long-term survival of 
the system.302  It makes a virtue of this uncertainty and focuses on 
developing institutions that can maintain cohesion and consistency 
while still preserving their ability to innovate.303 
Second, there are two dynamics that are critical to “fine tuning” 
where the interpretive system falls along the continuum between 
rigidity and randomness:  variation and interdependence.  Variation 
involves a focus on the degree of heterogeneity among lower court 
judges and circuits, and acknowledges the futility of settling on a 
single methodology or perspective on constitutional meaning; 
instead, it sees the value in keeping multiple interpretive visions in 
play rather than locking into a single set of supreme normative 
commitments.304  Interdependence involves a focus on how judges 
                                                          
 301. Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra note 25, at 1442. 
 302. See generally id. at 1410 (explaining how the most successful complex systems 
“maintain a chaotic, random component in order to achieve . . . self-sustainability”).  
 303. Id.  
 304. See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing:  The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in 
Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 724 (1994) (“When values are diverse but 
important, the preservation of this tension between valuesrather than the total 
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and circuits interact with one another, recognizing that constitutional 
law is an act of co-creation by multiple actors whose actions affect one 
another.305  These dynamics call for greater attention to forces that 
affect the system’s level of variation and interdependence, including 
“outlier circuits” and “attractor judges.” 
A. The Balance Between Rigidity and Randomness 
Complex adaptive systems achieve optimal performance when they 
operate on “the edge of chaos,” maintaining an ideal balance 
between rigidity and randomness.306  A complex adaptive system 
where the agents’ behavior is too rigid becomes static and paralyzed, 
unable to innovate or make necessary modifications in response to 
changing circumstances.307  It risks obsolescence and the possibility 
that the system’s agents become “stuck” at a sub-optimal point with 
no way to improve their condition.  Hence, some level of uncertainty 
is necessary if the system is going to retain its ability to disrupt its own 
patterns of behavior and adapt.308   
On the other hand, systems where the agents’ behavior is too 
random and unpredictable become chaotic and break apart, unable 
to coordinate behavior between different elements of the system.309  
Emergent patterns are necessary for a system to maintain a coherent 
identity and avoid disintegration.  
When applied to organizations, complexity theory can be seen as a 
way to help an institution balance the competing pulls toward 
disintegration and ossification.310  To manage growth and become 
more efficient, organizations decentralize.311  In the process, they risk 
fragmentation, a loss of common culture, and dispersed power, all of 
which move them toward disintegration.312  To avoid these problems, 
organizations simultaneously move toward integration and 
                                                          
triumph of one set of valuesfosters the richness of a complex society with multiple 
aspirations.”); see also Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1099, 1174 (2005) (quoting the above). 
 305. Songer, supra note 48, at 675–77 (exploring the extent to which circuit courts 
act at the behest of the Supreme Court and the extent to which circuit courts act on 
their own behalf). 
 306. See KAUFFMAN, supra note 259, at 86 (explaining that stability and flexibility 
are best achieved through “a kind of poised state balanced on the edge of chaos”).  
 307. Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra note 25, at 1442. 
 308. See id. at 1477 (“Complexity Theory demonstrates that the adaptive qualities 
of democracy cannot be retained if the unpredictable forces that make it adaptive 
are removed.”). 
 309. See KAUFFMAN, supra note 259, at 73–74, 90 (explaining that, in chaotic 
systems, small changes can result in “profound disturbances”). 
 310. Stacey, supra note 251, at 13. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id.  
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centralized control, creating a greater risk of rigidity and 
stagnation.313  The goal is to determine how institutions achieve this 
difficult balance between disintegration and ossification, and how 
those lessons can be integrated into a system’s design.314   
A complexity theory of lower court constitutionalism starts with the 
proposition that lower courts play a role in setting the emergent 
patterns that situate where the system falls along the continuum 
between randomness and rigidity.  It then asks how these courts 
should use their discretionary space to help move the interpretive 
system toward the “sweet spot” between the two, a place where the 
system maximizes its ability to evolve and adapt without losing its 
integrity and the legitimacy that comes from its predictability.315  
B. Tuning the System 
If the “sweet spot” is the Holy Grail, there are two questions that 
follow.  First, how can an observer detect whether the system has 
become too rigid or too random, or where it is in relation to the 
“sweet spot”?  Second, how can one go about “tuning” the system?  
Are there ways to go about adjusting the levels, creating greater or 
lesser amounts of rigidity and randomness so that the system moves 
closer to the “sweet spot”? 
The first question is the jump-off point for any serious effort to 
apply a complexity framework to constitutional theory but is beyond 
the limited scope of this Article.  However, even if it is impossible to 
know with certainty where on the continuum the judicial interpretive 
system resides or whether the levels of stagnancy and disruption 
within the system are optimal, there are ways to answer the second 
question and define the methods for nudging the system in one 
direction or another.  
In particular, two factors help complex adaptive systems reach a 
“compromise between malleability and stability”316:  variation and 
interdependence.317 
1. Variation 
Complex systems can adapt to change because they maintain a 
                                                          
 313. Id. 
 314. Id.  
 315. Id. at 10–17. 
 316. KAUFFMAN, supra note 259, at 73, 80–81, 85. 
 317. See David J. Gerber, Method, Community & Comparative Law:  An Encounter with 
Complexity Science, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 110, 113–14 (2011) (explaining how, 
in complex adaptive systems, the components are diverse, interconnected, and 
interdependent, and react to other components in the system). 
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population of heterogeneous agents.  This variation facilitates 
adaptation in at least three ways.   
First, a wider diversity of agents increases the system’s capacity to 
seek out new fitness peaks, as different types of agents can 
simultaneously seek out a broader range of strategies to increase their 
fitness levels.318  In turn, this makes it more likely that the system will 
discover ways to improve its overall performance.319  All organizations 
struggle with choices about whether to invest resources in creating 
new options (exploration) versus copying effective existing solutions 
(exploitation).320  Too much exploration can lead to a state of 
“eternal boiling,” where constant change prevents the organization 
from finding stability; too much exploitation can lead to “premature 
convergence,” where the organization settles too quickly on a sub-
optimal solution.321  Higher levels of variation within a system tend to 
move the balance further toward exploration, as different agents seek 
out new strategies rather than replicating the behavior of similar 
agents. 
Second, complex adaptive systems composed of diverse types of 
agents are more likely to survive potentially catastrophic changes in 
their environment.322  For example, a field composed of a single crop 
is at greater risk of destruction from shifting conditions, like the 
arrival of a new parasite.  But an ecosystem composed of many 
different crops is more likely to survive because there is an increased 
possibility that one of the agents may be well-adapted to function in 
the new environment, and that a successful adaptation made by one 
agent can have positive effects on others.323 
Finally, variation helps complex systems avoid becoming stuck at a 
sub-optimal point.  For example, Brannon Denning and Glenn 
Reynolds have argued that circuit courts display a status quo bias in 
certain areas of constitutional law that causes them to resist signals 
                                                          
 318. See PETERS, supra note 262, at 47; John H. Davidson & Thomas Earl Geu, The 
Missouri River and Adaptive Management:  Protecting Ecological Function and Legal Process, 
80 NEB. L. REV. 816, 890 (2001) (suggesting that, in complex adaptive systems, agents 
work together, recognizing that there is “no single ‘best way’” to make a decision). 
 319. See PETERS, supra note 262, at 57; Gregory Todd Jones, Sustainability, 
Complexity, and the Negotiation of Constraint, 44 TULSA L. REV. 29, 38 (2008) (explaining 
the effect of diversity on adaptation); see also SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE:  HOW 
THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 173–
74 (2007) (stressing the benefits of diversity). 
 320. AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 278, at 43. 
 321. Id. at 43–44. 
 322. Jones, supra note 319, at 39 n.30. 
 323. See AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 278, at 108 (commenting on the fragility of 
“monoculture”); MILLER & PAGE, supra note 296, at 29 (suggesting that 
“heterogeneity is an important means by which to improve the robustness of 
systems”). 
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from the Supreme Court about doctrinal change.324  They suggest that 
the huge increase in lower court caseloads has caused federal 
appellate judges, as a group, to adopt decision-rules that make it 
easier to resolve cases quickly and efficiently.325  Since drawing 
distinctions between conflicting court precedents or figuring out how 
a given decision changes the legal landscape is time-consuming, it 
may be easier for most appellate judges to, en masse, blunt the 
impact of certain doctrinal changes on the established status quo.  By 
contrast, a diverse group of agents with different incentives and goals 
increases the probability that some agents will be motivated to 
explore solutions that challenge prevailing norms, mitigating the 
institutional incentives that lead to status quo bias.  
The costs of getting “stuck” are particularly serious for 
constitutional interpretation.  Unlike common law or statutory 
interpretation, courts cannot rely on Congress or any other 
institutional entity to modify a sub-optimal constitutional rule.326  This 
creates the risk of significant additional costs when lower courts fall 
victim to “cascade effects” in a constitutional context, with 
subsequent decision-makers simply following the actions of prior 
ones.327  Suppose Circuit A uses its discretionary space to adopt a sub-
optimal rule that is subsequently followed by Circuits B, C, and D.  
When Circuits B, C, and D blindly follow Circuit A, it becomes nearly 
impossible for external actors—other than the Supreme Court or 
Congress through a constitutional amendment—to modify Circuit 
A’s rule to adjust for changing conditions, and the system risks being 
stuck with a sub-optimal rule for long periods of time. 
2. Outlier judges and circuits 
Altering the level of variation among agents is one mechanism for 
tweaking where the system falls on the continuum between rigidity 
and randomness.328  Within the circuit courts, variation can be 
adjusted through changes in the number, distribution, and 
                                                          
 324. See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s Future in the Lower 
Courts, 102 NW. L. REV. 2035, 2039 (2008) (commenting on the fact that “the courts 
of appeals have a history of more or less open hostility to claims of a private right to 
arms”); see also Denning & Reynolds, supra note 7, at 1297–98 (analyzing the 
“[o]pinions upholding federal statutes after Lopez and Morrison” and noting lower 
courts’ “aversion to exploring the larger implications” of these decisions and 
“presumption that neither case significantly changed the constitutional status quo”). 
 325. Reynolds & Denning, supra note 324, at 2039. 
 326. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law:  The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 656 (2001). 
 327. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 10–11 (2003).   
 328. See generally Gerken, supra note 304, at 1161–63 (comparing the democratic 
outputs of systems that are first-order and second-order diversity). 
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ideological composition of “outlier judges”—judges whose viewpoints 
vary significantly from the median circuit judge’s ideology.329   
Outlier judges are more likely to take experimental risks, 
innovate,330 and issue dissents,331 which helps counteract conformity 
and other group behaviors that ossify interpretive development.332  
They also have greater incentives to act as what Wayne McIntosh and 
Cynthia Cates call “entrepreneurial judge[s].”333  As they define it, an 
entrepreneurial judge is “one who is alert to the opportunity for 
innovation, who is willing to invest the resources and assume the risks 
necessary to offer and develop a genuinely unique legal concept, and 
who must strategically employ the written word to undertake 
change.”334  Outlier judges inject variation into the system:  
“entrepreneurship is the force that moves innovation,”335 innovation 
is the process that creates change, and change is essential for the 
system to maintain its adaptive qualities. 
An increase in the number or concentration of outlier judges does 
not necessarily “tune” the system toward greater variation and 
innovation.  Instead, emergent behavior among circuit judges directly 
affects the question of how to best create variation within the system.  
Circuit panels are often subject to “panel effects,” where the 
composition of the panel either amplifies or dampens the effect of 
ideology on how a judge votes.336  A three-judge panel composed of 
judges appointed by both Republicans and Democrats tends to 
“dampen” the effect of judicial ideology, while a panel composed of 
judges of the same party is more likely to “amplify” ideological 
effects.337  As a result, Cass Sunstein has argued that each circuit panel 
should contain at least one member of each party as a way to 
minimize ideological amplification and counteract certain emergent 
panel behaviors.338 
Yet, as Heather Gerken notes, emergent behavior can cause this 
                                                          
 329. Cf. Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy?  Policy Innovation in 
Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1347–48 (2009) (explaining why 
“extreme outliers will tend to innovate”). 
 330. See id. at 1349 (discussing how states with more available resources are more 
likely to take on innovation). 
 331. See HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 293, at 75–77 (addressing whether judges 
“use dissents strategically”). 
 332. SUNSTEIN, supra note 327, at 11; see Gerken, supra note 304, at 1191–92 
(considering Sunstein’s theory of dissent). 
 333. WAYNE V. MCINTOSH & CYNTHIA L. CATES, JUDICIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP:  THE 
ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 5 (1997). 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. at 5–6. 
 336. SUNSTEIN, supra note 327, at 166–67.  
 337. Id. at 166–68. 
 338. Id. 
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variation at the panel level to lead to more homogenous decisions 
system-wide.  As each individual appellate panel becomes more 
diverse internally and the effect of their ideological differences is 
dampened, their outcomes are likely to look more similar to one 
another and the level of system-wide variation actually declines.339   
A different approach, using what Gerken calls “second order 
diversity,” would focus on diversifying circuits in relation to other 
circuits rather than individual judges.340  Some circuits would be 
liberal, some conservative, and some moderate.  Unlike a judge-based 
approach, this would lead to an increased likelihood of “outlier” 
circuits whose decisions differ significantly from the decisions issued 
by the median circuit or the majority of other circuits.  This approach 
would effectively create a small number of majority-minority pockets 
within the federal courts of appeals, offering the potential for 
minority viewpoints to be embodied in a governing decision rather 
than relegated to a fringe dissent.341   
From a complex adaptive systems design perspective, “second 
order diversity” offers at least three distinct advantages:  a higher level 
of interpretive variation, greater transparency, and a heightened 
commitment to maintaining a pluralist approach to constitutional 
values.   
Outlier circuits move minority interpretations from mere dissents 
to majority decisions, facilitating a more active form of interpretive 
experimentation and allowing the system to accumulate real world 
feedback about different approaches.342  Moreover, these majority 
opinions might encourage risk-averse judges in other circuits to pay 
attention and consider adopting beneficial innovations that they 
might be unwilling to consider on their own.343  This is particularly 
relevant in light of evidence that dissents are rarely cited by other 
judges, either within or outside the circuit.344 
Outlier circuits are also likely to be more transparent about their 
efforts to disrupt the system than individual judges.  In a “first order 
diversity”345 environment where judges on a circuit panel have diverse 
                                                          
 339. See Gerken, supra note 304, at 1192 (“[I]t is precisely the homogeneous 
groupings of which Sunstein is rightly wary that may produce visible dissent in the 
system as a whole, and it is the heterogeneous groupings that Sunstein lauds that 
submerge dissent at the aggregate level.”). 
 340. Id. at 1102–03. 
 341. Id. at 1161. 
 342. Id. at 1104. 
 343. Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy:  Interest, Ideology, and 
Innovation, 22 WM. &. MARY L. REV. 639, 673–74 (1981). 
 344. Epstein et al., supra note 294, at 101. 
 345. See Gerken, supra note 304, at 1102 (defining “first order diversity” as the 
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viewpoints, innovators are more likely to interpret law in 
“subterranean ways” that reflect subtle compromise among different 
perspectives on the panel or risk en banc reversal if the decision 
moves too far from the position taken by the circuit’s median judge.346  
By contrast, outlier circuits, influenced by group polarization, are 
more likely to produce opinions that are clear about exactly what 
they are doing, making it easier for other circuits and the Court to 
consider, accept, or reject those innovations.347 
Finally, diversity at the circuit level would better serve percolation’s 
goal of maintaining cohesion within a diverse pluralistic society by 
increasing the chances that a group with a particular theory about 
how the Constitution should work will see their vision reflected in 
some part of the judicial system.348  This increases the possibility that 
those groups will continue to use constitutional means to resolve 
disagreement, rather than simply opting out.   
The relationship between variation, resilience, and adaptivity 
suggests, at minimum, that interpretive differences among circuits 
are not necessarily bad.349 Moreover, it raises the possibility that 
variation in the use of discretionary space—whether there are 
sufficient differences in interpretive approaches among circuit courts 
considering similar questions—may ultimately prove more important 
to the system’s continued survival and optimal performance than 
whether circuit courts arrive at the “best” answer or an answer that 
aligns with the Supreme Court’s policy preferences. 
3. Interdependence and patching  
Our constitutional system allows for what Robert Cover called 
“polycentric norm articulation,”350 where multiple judicial actors 
articulate and interpret legal rules.351  This allows different judges to 
deal with similar problems simultaneously, and “generates a density 
                                                          
standard conceptualization of statistical integration, such that the composition of 
decision-making bodies reflects the populations they represent). 
 346. Cf. id. at 1125 (discussing majoritarian rule under a first-order unitary system 
of diversity, where decisions of the democratic body ultimately reflect “the 
institutional equivalent of the swing voter” provided the body is not divided among 
group lines). 
 347. See id. (noting that unfragmented first-order diversity systems tend to 
replicate the same decision-making process). 
 348. Id. at 1126. 
 349. See Ruhl, supra note 243, at 1378 (“Because it opens up options, response 
diversity enhances resilience.”). 
 350. Cover, supra note 343, at 673. 
 351. See id. at 673–74 (positing that a polycentric norm articulation system usually 
leads to jurisdictional redundancy).  
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of experience that produces information quickly.”352  Complexity 
theory provides a framework for thinking about how polycentric 
systems work,353 and how changes in the system’s design can affect the 
way agents interact with one another.354  In particular, complexity 
theory focuses on the level of interdependence among decentralized 
agents—the degree to which actions by an agent affect the actions of 
other agents or the performance of other parts of the system—and 
how changes in the level of interdependence affect the system’s 
emergent behavior.355  
Interdependence becomes particularly critical for coordination as 
hierarchical organizations become more complex.  As the number 
and diversity of agents within a system increases, the agents begin to 
generate too much information for a centralized body to absorb and 
process, and management can become divorced from the core 
functional work of the system.356  This makes coordinating agent 
behavior through centralized control more difficult, and, as a result, 
lateral methods of coordination begin to emerge among agents.357   
Our polyarchical interpretive system displays many signs of an 
organization moving toward complexity.  The number of 
constitutional cases heard by the system has sharply increased,358 
generating lots of simultaneous information and putting greater 
pressure on the Court’s ability to supervise interpretive efforts by the 
federal courts and fifty state court systems.  In addition, a discrepancy 
has appeared between the types of constitutional cases heard by lower 
federal courts and the cases reviewed by the Supreme Court, creating 
                                                          
 352. Id. at 678. 
 353. See Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra note 25, at 1471 (suggesting that the common 
law prospers in a “coupled patches” legal system). 
 354. See id. at 1463 (explaining that as species travel across different landscapes, 
they necessarily alter the landscapes of other species in the same ecosystem, causing 
those other species to change their course of action). 
 355. Id. 
 356. BAR-YAM, supra note 246, at 812–13 (elaborating that, during the complexity 
transition, management is unable to perform control functions because of its 
separation from the “functional aspects of the system”). 
 357. See HOWARD, supra note 122, at 294 (noting that “[f]ederal courts, combining 
a hierarchy of doctrine with decentralized administration, have nevertheless 
managed to coordinate their activities without heavy reliance on formal or external 
controls” through the use of “internalized norms” that strike a balance between 
individualism and consensus); see also BAR-YAM, supra note 246, at 812–13 (explaining 
why lateral interactions are necessary to replace the control functions management is 
unable to perform). 
 358. See, e.g., SONGER ET AL., supra note 110, at 66–68 (data showing that the 
percentage of circuit court cases involving constitutional issues “rise substantially 
after 1970”); Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1:  A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 
DENV. U. L. REV. 287, 294–95 (2010) (attributing a marked increase in the volume of 
litigation in part to the proliferation of new constitutional claims). 
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a functional gap between the nature of constitutional lawmaking at 
different levels of the federal court system.359  In this context, 
emergent forms of coordination become increasingly necessary for 
the system to maintain its collective integrity.   
Higher levels of interdependence among agents can create greater 
unpredictability by increasing the number of possible emergent 
combinations within the system.360  When each agent’s actions are 
interdependent with large numbers of other agents, there is an 
increased possibility that a small change in a single agent’s behavior 
can impact the entire system (known as the “butterfly effect”).361  This 
can make the entire system highly sensitive to small shifts in the 
system’s environment and thus very volatile.362  
To avoid this problem, system designers establish “patches,” sub-
groups of semi-autonomous agents that only seek to maximize the 
fitness level of their “patch.”363  They do not concern themselves with 
how their actions affect other patches or the system’s aggregate 
fitness level.364  Yet surprisingly, in certain contexts, patching can 
actually improve the system’s overall performance.365  It does so by 
allowing for some controlled “coupling” (or spillover effects) among 
agents from different patches, where a change by an agent or agents 
in one patch has some effect on the fitness levels of some number of 
other agents in other patches. 
As J.B. Ruhl explains: 
take a hard, conflict-laden task in which many parts interact, and 
divide it into a quilt of non-overlapping patches.  Try to optimize 
within each patch.  As this occurs, the couplings between parts in 
                                                          
 359. Klein, supra note 229, at 120–22 (identifying the factors leading to Supreme 
Court versus lower federal court review). 
 360. See Daniel A. Levinthal & Massimo Warglien, Landscape Design:  Designing for 
Local Action in Complex Worlds, 10 ORG. SCI. 342, 344 (1999) (explaining how, with a 
high degree of interdependence, a change in a single action can appear 
dysfunctional). 
 361. DONALD WORSTER, NATURE’S ECONOMY:  A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL IDEAS 407 
(2d ed. 1994).  
 362. See Levinthal & Warglien, supra note 360, at 344 (utilizing Stuart Kauffman’s 
conclusion that the topography of a fitness landscape is influenced by the degree of 
interdependency among genes); see also STUART A. KAUFFMAN, THE ORIGINS OF ORDER:  
SELF-ORGANIZATION AND SELECTION IN EVOLUTION 89 (1993) (analyzing the 
implications of rugged fitness landscapes to determine “how often and how 
dramatically landscapes change”).  
 363. Cherry, supra note 25, at 391 (noting that individual elements within a patch 
are permitted to change if, and only if, the change is beneficial to the aggregate 
fitness of the patch).  
 364. See id. (stating that the “patching algorithm” seeks local, rather than global, 
improvements in fitness). 
 365. David G. Post & David R. Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”:  
Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1055, 1078 (1998).   
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two patches across patch boundaries will mean that finding a 
“good” solution in one patch will change the problem to be solved 
by the parts in adjacent patches.366 
This targeted destabilization, in turn, counteracts the system’s 
aggregate tendency to stagnate around sub-optimal points and moves 
the whole system toward higher performance.367   
Patching is a common feature in the institutional design of legal 
systems; a system that mixes separation of powers (patches) with 
checks and balances (coupling) relies upon it.368  Federalism operates 
as a form of “patching” by enabling states to experiment with 
different policies while controlling the potential for spillover effects 
from one state to another.369  Similarly, the rules governing inter-
circuit stare decisis create “patches” among federal courts of appeal, 
where the decisions issued by one circuit have no binding effect on 
other circuits.370  Coupling is formally managed by a centralized 
entity—the Supreme Court—that retains the sole power to impose 
one circuit’s interpretation on another through vertical stare decisis. 
As a design strategy, patching in a complex adaptive system has 
many benefits.  It lowers the costs and risks associated with 
experimentation, since a poor outcome only affects a single patch 
rather than the entire system.  It allows the system to search for new 
information and strategies more efficiently, particularly when 
relevant information is concentrated locally.  It lowers administrative 
costs, since it limits the need for a centralizing body to manage 
negative externalities.  And by restricting spillover effects, it limits the 
potential for a catastrophe to sink the entire system.371  
Patching’s effectiveness is adjusted by tinkering with the number of 
                                                          
 366. Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra note 25, at 1469. 
 367. Cherry, supra note 25, at 391–92; see Post & Johnson, supra note 365, at 1079 
(explaining why patching is effective). 
 368. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword:  Law as Equilibrium, 
108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 101–02 (1994) (asserting that the overarching Constitution-
based canon is to avoid interpretations that would render a statute unconstitutional); 
Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 
91 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 28, 28 (1997) (positing that justices, in order to impose their 
own policy preferences on society, must defer to Congress’ preferences in cases 
involving statutory interpretation).  
 369. Cherry, supra note 25, at 393 (quoting Justice Brandeis, who described 
federalism as a way to allow “a single courageous state [to] serve as a laboratory . . . 
without risk to the rest of the country”). 
 370. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 130, at 1572 (pointing out that all thirteen circuit 
courts issue decisions interpreting the meaning of federal statutes and regulations, 
but are not obliged to follow another circuit’s lead).  
 371. Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 25 (suggesting that a patch-system is better able to 
handle adverse circumstances because it has more “problem-solving units in 
operation”). 
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patches and the degree of coupling among them.372  If coupling 
among patches is too low, the system tends to ossify and stops 
searching for better alternatives as each patch settles into its own 
local equilibrium.  On the other hand, high levels of coupling can 
destabilize the system and decrease the level (and benefits) of 
variation among patches as each patch begins to lose its distinctive 
character.373  The goal is to find a middle ground—a “sweet spot”—
with an intermediate level of coupling among patches.374   
4. Attractor judges 
Interdependence raises a different set of questions about lower 
court constitutionalism.  What types of emergent “coupling” exist 
among circuits?  Do constitutional rulings by one circuit affect the 
behavior of others, and if so, how?  What emergent forms of 
cooperation and disruption exist at lower levels of the federal 
judiciary?  How might adjustments in the number of patches and the 
level of coupling change interpretive outputs?  
The dearth of research on the level of interdependence among 
circuit “patches” makes it extremely difficult to draw broad 
conclusions about how they interact with one another. David Klein’s 
study of the role of circuit courts in the development of new legal 
doctrine is the most extensive work to date on inter-circuit influence 
in the percolation process.375 Klein looked at eighty-one courts of 
appeals decisions released between 1984 and 1990 that announced 
“new rules” in three areas—antitrust, search and seizure, and 
environmental law376—and the subsequent treatment of these “new 
rules” by other courts of appeals.377  Klein found that other courts 
granted favorable treatment to newly created legal rules issued by a 
sister circuit a little more than two-thirds of the time.378  His research 
                                                          
 372. See id. (contending that complexity theory tests different combinations and 
variables within a system, such as the size of the system, what happens in a system that 
is tightly versus loosely coupled, and how many patches are required to generate 
adaptive problem-solving); see also Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra note 25, at 1470 
(questioning what patch size and degree of coupling leads to the strongest fitness 
levels across the system).  
 373. See Tom S. Clark & Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Supreme Court and Percolation in 
the Lower Courts:  An Optimal Stopping Model, at 26, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1663959 (suggesting that “[i]f 
lower courts follow each other, superior courts gain less information from their 
decisions than if the lower courts ignore each other” due to increased risk of an 
information cascade).  
 374. Post & Johnson, supra note 365, at 1089–91. 
 375. KLEIN, supra note 229, at 21. 
 376. Id. at 46. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. at 60–61. 
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also found wide variation in the extent to which circuit judges cite to 
decisions made by other circuits when confronted with novel legal 
issues or when they issue a ruling that conflicts with a decision 
reached by another circuit.379  
Klein also interviewed twenty-four active and senior circuit judges, 
and found “considerable variation” in their attitudes toward other 
circuits.380  Some judges paid little attention to how other circuits had 
interpreted a particular rule; others viewed consensus among circuits 
as a good in-and-of-itself.381  Judges were also asked about the need for 
legal coherence and uniformity in reaching decisions, and Klein 
found wide variations among the judges—of the twenty-four judges 
he surveyed, only one half of them valued coherence and uniformity 
as “very important” or “important” goals.382  By contrast, all of the 
judges rated reaching “legally correct decisions” as a critical goal, and 
sixteen of them gave high priority to reaching “prompt decisions.”383   
While following other circuits’ lead does not appear to be a 
pervasive value among circuit judges,384 there are still emergent 
interdependencies among circuits that affect the content of 
constitutional law.385  For example, the extent to which a given circuit 
panel will rely on precedent from outside the circuit is affected by a 
number of factors, including the presence of issues of first 
impression,386 the level of ideological division within a circuit,387 the 
appearance of a dissent,388 the issuing circuit’s overall reputation,389 
and the political affiliation of the judges on the issuing panel.390 
Interdependency is also affected by the identity of the specific 
                                                          
 379. See id. at 56–60 (concluding that “[p]recedents are frequently overlooked”).   
 380. Id. at 90–91. 
 381. Id. at 88–90. 
 382. Id. at 22, 88–90. 
 383. Id. at 22–25. 
 384. See Frost, supra note 130, at 1572 (articulating that federal circuits are neither 
required, nor compelled, to adopt the precedent of circuits that have already 
decided an issue). 
 385. See Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court:  An Empirical Study 
of their Use and Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 490, 492 (examining the 
frequency of the Supreme Court justices’ citation usage and citation rates and their 
ramifications for “the practical development of the law”). 
 386. See Solberg et al., supra note 212, at 281 (explaining that “issues of first 
impression” occur when “the panel [indicates] that they did not locate existing 
binding precedent to guide the majority’s reasoning”).  
 387. Id. 
 388. KLEIN, supra note 229, at 83. 
 389. CROSS, supra note 105, at 218. 
 390. Id. at 213–14; Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations:  A 
Window into the Behavior of Judges?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 87, 119 (2008) (empirical study 
concluding that federal circuit judges “cite judges of the opposite political party 
significantly less often than would be expected”). 
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judge writing the opinion.  Studies examining circuit judge citation 
practices have repeatedly shown that all circuit judges are not created 
equal.391  Instead, a select few exercise far more influence over their 
colleagues than others, and they are more likely to see their opinions 
cited within and outside their circuit.392   
These “attractor judges” provide a source of coupling across 
circuits, serving as a source of both stability and disruption within the 
system.  On one hand, they bring stability by exerting influence 
outside of their “patch,” offering the potential to bring disparate 
judicial agents together at a common point.  At the same time, their 
influence allows them to destabilize existing equilibria in other 
circuit-patches, enhancing the dynamic quality of the system.  
A fully realized complexity theory of lower court constitutionalism 
would consider the optimal ideological composition, number, and 
distribution of attractor judges within the system.  Using newly 
developed analytic methods designed to track dynamic relationships 
among agents, like network analysis393 and agent-based modeling,394 it 
would seek to account for other circuit interdependencies, examine 
their emergent effects, and recommend methods to “tune” the 
interdependencies within the system so it moves closer to the “edge 
of chaos”395 without going over the brink.396  
CONCLUSION 
Judge-made constitutional law is much broader than what the 
Supreme Court mandates.  As David Klein concluded, the Supreme 
Court “cannot maintain anything like complete control over the 
                                                          
 391. Cf. Cross et al., supra note 385, at 490 (explaining why Supreme Court justices 
must exercise “considerable discretion” in determining which prior precedents are 
relevant to their decisions). 
 392. Cf. William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence:  A Citation Analysis of Federal 
Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 307–12 (1998) (finding a positive 
correlation of .69 for “outside- and inside-circuit citations”); See Stephen J. Choi & G. 
Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice:  An Empirical Ranking of Judge 
Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 49–58 (2004) (empirical study measuring citations 
by other judges as an indicator of opinion quality). 
 393. See James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law:  Measuring the Legal 
Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324, 335 (2007) 
(determining which cases are most relevant based on how frequently the Supreme 
Court justices cite to them). 
 394. See Eric Bonabeau, Agent-Based Modeling:  Methods and Techniques for Simulating 
Human Systems, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7280, 7280–81 (2002) (explaining that an 
agent-based modeling system is comprised of “agents,” individual and autonomous 
decision-making entities, and is characterized by “[r]epetitive competitive 
interactions” between these agents).  
 395. Supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
 396. Ruhl, Fitness of Laws, supra note 25, at 1420 (positing that the “edge of chaos” 
is where the system performs at optimum levels). 
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evolution of federal legal policy.  Outside of the relatively few areas 
each year in which [the Court] can actively intervene, its power to 
shape developments is tightly circumscribed.”397  For too long, 
constitutional theory has largely ignored this fact, treating 
discretionary space as either a threat to hierarchical order or an 
opportunity to impose a grand unified interpretive theory on the 
entire judicial system. 
This Article is meant as an initial effort to move the normative 
conversation about lower court constitutionalism away from concerns 
about hierarchy or methodology and explore what a theory of lower 
court constitutionalism might look like if it accepted indeterminacy 
as a given and sought to develop a system that used uncertainty to 
ensure its own adaptation and survival.   
It is not, however, an argument for interpretive chaos.  It applies 
complexity theory to a very small range of activity performed by a 
fundamentally hierarchical institution398—the places where circuit 
courts have some discretionary space over how to interpret the 
Constitution.  The Supreme Court retains the ability to cut off an 
experiment at any time or impose predictability if the level of 
variation proves destabilizing, and the system retains all of its 
stabilizing features, including life tenure, judicial methodology, stare 
decisis, and vertical precedent. 
This Article is also an incomplete exploration.  Federal circuit 
courts are just one group of agents within an entire complex adaptive 
system of interpretation that includes the Supreme Court, trial 
courts, state courts, elected officials, law enforcement, social 
movements, and other entities that help to collectively define 
constitutional meaning.  Emergence means that change in one part 
of an interdependent system can alter the behavior of other parts,399 
making it difficult to predict exactly how changes in the levels of 
circuit court variation or interdependence will operate in practice. 
Yet the integration of lower court constitutionalism and complexity 
theory offers exciting possibilities, creating an affirmative role for 
lower courts in the development of constitutional law.  This path 
                                                          
 397. Klein, supra note 229, at 135; see Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the 
Substance of Constitutional Law, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000735 (explaining how limits on the Supreme Court’s 
review capacity affects the substance of its constitutional rulings). 
 398. Even if circuit courts are not fully self-organizing and their outputs are 
partially dictated by a centralized source, the “hierarchy serves as a kind of 
scaffolding for creating a complex system,” one that will only grow more complex in 
response to the growing complexity of its environment.  BAR-YAM, supra note 246, at 
812. 
 399. Supra notes 279–282 and accompanying text. 
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looks to networks instead of hierarchies as a model for institutional 
design in an increasingly complex world, asking how changes in 
variation and interdependence can enhance the system’s adaptive 
capacity and better ensure its long-term survival.  More than 
anything, it establishes constitutional change as a process that is 
bottom-up as well as top-down and begins the process of aligning 
constitutional theory with the way constitutional law is actually made. 
